The Unintended Political Consequences of Higher Education in the PRC by Carroll Goldman, Allison
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
CUREJ - College Undergraduate Research
Electronic Journal College of Arts and Sciences
5-5-2011
The Unintended Political Consequences of Higher
Education in the PRC
Allison Carroll Goldman
University of Pennsylvania, acarrollgoldman@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/curej
Part of the Comparative Politics Commons, and the Political Economy Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/curej/149
For more information, please contact libraryrepository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carroll Goldman, Allison, "The Unintended Political Consequences of Higher Education in the
PRC" 05 May 2011. CUREJ: College Undergraduate Research Electronic Journal, University of
Pennsylvania, http://repository.upenn.edu/curej/149.
The Unintended Political Consequences of Higher Education in the PRC
Abstract
In the past 10 years, China has grown its higher education sector into the largest in the world. At the same
time, growing international integration of Chinese institutions means increasing cross-fertilization of ideas
across national borders. While the literature on these developments has focused largely on their economic
implications, this study asks what they mean politically. In light of current questions regarding political debate
and reform in the Chinese Communist Party, this paper suggests new higher education policies may have
important unintended consequences for the future of Chinese political development. As Chinese political
leaders continue to reform and adapt policies to strengthen CCP legitimacy, they hope elite universities will
train a new generation of leaders and advise current decision-making through think tanks and research
centers. Once they train people to think critically and independently, however how long can the CCP expect
to retain control over the direction of that thinking? Higher education is an uncertain variable. Based on the
massive expansion of China’s higher education system, this study suggests it could hold potential for far-
reaching unintended consequences.
Keywords
China, Higher Education, Political Economics, Development, Institutional Development, Humanities, Social
Sciences, Political Science, Avery Goldstein, Goldstein, Avery
Disciplines
Comparative Politics | Political Economy
This article is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/curej/149
  
 
 
Modernizing China?  
The Unintended Political Consequences of Higher 
Education in the PRC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Senior Thesis in Political Science  
By: Allison Carroll Goldman 
Advisor: Avery Goldstein  
Spring 2011 
 
 2
Abstract 
 
In the past 10 years, China has grown its higher education sector into the 
largest in the world. At the same time, growing international integration of 
Chinese institutions means increasing cross-fertilization of ideas across 
national borders. While the literature on these developments has focused 
largely on their economic implications, this study asks what they mean 
politically. In light of current questions regarding political debate and reform 
in the Chinese Communist Party, this paper suggests new higher education 
policies may have important unintended consequences for the future of 
Chinese political development. As Chinese political leaders continue to reform 
and adapt policies to strengthen CCP legitimacy, they hope elite universities 
will train a new generation of leaders and advise current decision-making 
through think tanks and research centers. Once they train people to think 
critically and independently, however how long can the CCP expect to retain 
control over the direction of that thinking? Higher education is an uncertain 
variable. Based on the massive expansion of China’s higher education system, 
this study suggests it could hold potential for far-reaching unintended 
consequences.  
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Introduction 
 
 
 Suppose that, in the name of modernization, you took a widely agricultural, 
feudalistic society that, once great, had lived through a century of humiliation and 
exploitation at the hands of foreign powers, won massive popular support by leading a 
grassroots resistance against brutal Japanese invaders and equally exploitative 
nationalist army forces, and then dragooned it into traumatic social and political 
experiments for thirty years. What if you then took that same population, having been 
tormented by upheavals like the Great Leap Forward, which condemned tens of millions 
to early death by starvation, and the Cultural Revolution, which turned society upon 
itself in a massive bloodbath of ideological struggle, persecution and suffering, and 
instituted sweeping economic reforms? Imagine those reforms could be so effective as to 
create economic growth of over nine percent a year for almost thirty years - the fastest 
rate for a major economy anywhere, anytime in recorded history.1  This, of course, has 
been the experience of modern China over the past sixty-some years. 
 As a result, the Chinese political system today remains a work in progress. Its 
formal institutions of governance are weak and uncertain, and individuals in power 
spent their formative years in the social environment of Maoist rule. Moreover, they 
inherited a Confucian political philosophy of governance whereby ideal government 
resounds more with the philosopher king in Plato’s Republic than Locke’s Treatise on 
                                            
1 Zakaria, Fareed, The Post American World (New York: W.W. Norton, 2008), 
88. 
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Government.2  As the Chinese Communist Party (CCP or Party) moved to enter the 
modern economy, however, it found society too dynamic and information too scarce to 
allow truly enlightened centralized government. Instead, it decentralized power and 
began continuously scanning the globe for new institutional designs to help bolster 
legitimacy.3  
 In the fast-paced information age, authoritarian style centralized government 
may be outdated. At least, the frantic crackdowns with which Chinese leaders often try to 
impose stability suggests as much.4 China’s paranoid state often behaves as an emotional 
being. As rule of law is weak, the rule of men, with all their special interests and 
emotional responses, remains strong. So it follows that a dramatic shift in the 
socialization process of China’s elite, through increasingly international higher 
education, may play into the ongoing story of Chinese political development. The catch, 
however, is that ideational outcomes of education are not always predictable. Since 
China’s trajectory is completely without precedent, there are no clear models on which to 
draw. The Beijing leadership faces a dilemma. As a singular institution for governance, 
the fear is that, if it failed, China would literally have no institutions of governance to 
speak of. Anarchy would ensue. This creates enormous pressure on the central 
leadership to make sure its local leaders govern responsibly, and also explains why 
institutional reforms tend to be made internally within the Party itself. While Beijing is 
                                            
2 The Chinese conception of zhexuewang (哲学王) is very similar to the 
philosopher king.  
3 Shambaugh, David L. China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation 
(Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2008).  
4 For more information on the current state of Western rule of law in China, 
see Osnos, Evan, “Is China Giving Up On Western Rule Of Law?” The New 
Yorker, Letter From China, March 2011, 
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/evanosnos/2011/03/is-china-giving-
up-on-western-rule-of-law.html. 
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at the helm, this study reveals it is not always in control. 5 Beijing’s challenge is to tidy up 
a fearfully corrupt and unwieldy political apparatus while simultaneously convincing the 
Chinese people of its continued unity, effectiveness and relevance.  
 To this end, elite education plays a role. In the past ten years, the Chinese higher 
education system has grown to the largest in the world. To transform China into a 
“creative and innovative economy by 2020,” the central government has encouraged 
these trends. In its 2010 Talent Plan, Beijing pledged to increase the total number college 
graduates from 98.3 million in 2010, to 195 million by 2020. Once it teaches people to 
think creatively, critically and independently, however, to what extent can the Party 
expect to control the direction of their thinking? In devising an intricate system of tiered 
education, the Party hopes to train a new generation of leaders and officials able to 
design better public policies to preempt instability caused by newly educated social 
forces.6 As higher education becomes increasingly international, however, it is more 
likely to have unintended political consequences for the regime. Ideational flows from 
the West, especially the United States, are beginning to cross-fertilize with PRC ideology 
to produce interesting hybrids and policy outcomes. Moreover, as Beijing no longer 
exerts as much control over the Party apparatus because of massive decentralization, it 
may not be able to implement policies successfully.  
 To conceptualize these trends, it is helpful to envisage national institutions, as a 
kind of political technology, or an application of knowledge for practical purpose.7 In the 
Chinese case, many new institutional designs, such as the notion of building checks and 
balances into the Party through “intra-Party democracy,” or dangnei minzhu (党内民主), 
                                            
5 Corruption is difficult to weed out when states have weak institutions.  
6 Wang, Huiyao, “China’s Talent Plan: Where Will It Lead to?” Presentation at 
the Brookings Institution, Washington DC, September 20, 2010.  
7 Normally, institutions are simply thought of as designed over extended periods 
of time by sequential coalitions of special interests.  
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are intellectual imports. 8 To improve effective governance, the leadership increasingly 
looks to elite intellectuals and ideas developed in the university to inform public policy. 
While Western multi-party democracy is not what they have in mind, broader ideas on 
governance from the West do find their way into policy reforms as elites pick and choose 
structures that could be useful in the domestic landscape.  
 Considering that modern society is not “harmonious,” as Party leaders would like 
it to be, and economic growth that widens the gap between rich and poor often 
exacerbates political conflict, Beijing knows it will have to quicken political structural 
reform to survive.9 The notion of using institutional designs to help absorb social 
frictions and conflict through built-in pathways of resolution is just one of many ideas 
for institutional design imported through the education system.  
 Taking the recent expansion of higher education as its focus, this study offers a 
narrative for the process of institution building in the evolving People’s Republic to 
outline a framework for thinking about the unintended consequences and potential 
political reverberations of recent educational flows. To understand the sometimes 
seemingly irrational behavior of the Chinese state, it seeks out a new way of thinking 
about possible changes to China’s national decision-making process, and suggests higher 
education trends as a unique lens through which to study decision-making at the apex of 
the Chinese political system.  
   
 
 
                                            
8 Directives adopted at the Fourth Plenary Session of the 17th Central 
Committee of the CCP that called for institutional changes such as 
promoting democracy within the Party and intensifying the anticorruption 
drive within the leadership. See Li, Cheng, “Intra-Party Democracy: 
Should We Take it Seriously?” Brookings Institute, 2009.  
9 Shambaugh.  
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CHAPTER ONE:  
A Narrative Framework for Analysis  
 
 
 
 China’s economic modernization drive, launched in 1978 on the heels of Mao 
Zedong’s tumultuous reign, “ranks as one of the most dramatic episodes of social and 
economic transformation in history.” While it is striking to Western observers that “this 
process occurred in a unique political and economic context: a simultaneous transition 
from a state-socialist economic system and a quasi-totalitarian political system,” the 
Chinese leaders who instituted these policies are unlikely to have found this so strange. 10  
 Chinese policy-makers who oversaw this process of transformation spent their 
lives fighting political struggles in an insular economy. They were likely unfamiliar with 
Fukuyama’s modernization theory. Indeed, until the late 1990s, those in control of China 
were largely uneducated. 11  Having, for the most part, joined the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) in the 1920s during the Communist Revolution, they were selected for their 
revolutionary zeal as opposed to governing experience. Certainly, they did not closely 
follow Western literature on development. Mao’s China was pervasively anti-intellectual. 
By the time of his death in 1976, Mao had “virtually eliminated highly trained specialists 
from most significant decision making outside of key military projects.” In contrast to 
the Soviet model of communism, which stressed taking full advantage of technical 
                                            
10 Pei, Minxin, China’s Trapped Transition: the Limits of Developmental 
Autocracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2006), 1.  
11 On average, roughly 85% of the cadres in each locale’s leading bodies had 
junior high school level of education or less. Only 1.5 percent, on average, had 
at least had some higher education. See Lieberthal, 162.  
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expertise while keeping the creative and artistic intelligentsia under close supervision, 
Mao began targeting intellectuals early on.  Beginning as early as the Anti-Rightist 
Campaign in June 1957, his virulent anti-intellectualism meant intellectual elites were 
repeatedly singled out as targets for violence and political struggle. This was especially 
true during the Great Leap Forward (1958-61), and the subsequent Cultural Revolution 
(1966-76.)  
 At the institutional level, Mao “sought to eliminate practices such as university 
admissions that favored those who scored best on exams.” Since in China, as elsewhere, 
examinations tend to favor those from intellectual and elite backgrounds, he sought to 
transform the system into one that stressed ideology and practical knowledge rather than 
scholarship. During the Cultural Revolution, in fact, most schools, colleges and 
universities closed or simply stopped functioning. Students were called upon by Mao to 
organize as “Red Guards” and “were taught to demonize and dehumanize whole classes 
of people and to tolerate and celebrate gross violence, even sadism, against them.”12 
During this time, when children were encouraged to denounce their parents and political 
targets were paraded through screaming crowds, chaos was so bloody that “students at a 
Beijing girls’ school beat their vice-principal to death with nail-studded planks.”13 
National entrance examinations for higher education were abandoned. Haizheng Li 
reports that “from 1966 to 1969, no new students were admitted to colleges or 
universities. Graduate student admission was suspended even longer, for the twelve 
years from 1966 to 1977. Although official statistics show new enrollment starting in 
1970, those students were mostly admitted into college based on their family background 
and political considerations. Such admissions were only allowed for a few universities. 
There were no academic standards for either admission or for graduation. During this 
                                            
12  Lieberthal, 162, 172, 71,113. 
13 Osnos, Evan “Meet Dr. Freud: Does Psychoanalysis have a future in an 
authoritarian state?” The New Yorker, January 10, 2011. 
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period, the curricula, classes, and grading system were all distorted, not following the 
academic standards of higher education.”14  
 The leaders who dreamed up China’s economic modernization strategy at the end 
of the 1970s, therefore, were not only poorly educated, they also faced a massive shortage 
of experts, a depleted information system in which nearly every accurate source of 
information had been suppressed through years of coercion, a virtual absence of any 
institutions of governance, and had been themselves socialized by repeated purges 
against telling the truth or taking any independent initiative.15 Mao left a system that 
could not function without him, and his successors were left to rebuild with very few 
resources to guide them.  
 In advocating “universal values” as the natural inclination of humanity, one 
cannot avoid the fact that the current institutions of governance in place in most 
developed Western states were much less obvious at the time they were first suggested. It 
was not until the Enlightenment that many of the philosophical underpinnings of 
modern democracy were envisaged, and even then the necessary institutional changes 
had to be actively fought for. Revolutionaries built upon ideas developed by political 
philosophers, and relied on a rich cross-fertilization of theories on governance across 
time and place. The similarity of democratic institutions across the globe does not stem 
from Jungian collective unconscious. These systems are highly complex. International 
similarities are the result of international influence. As Devesh Kapur described in 
Diaspora, Development and Democracy: the domestic impact of international 
migration from India, “foreign education, especially in Western universities, has been a 
key mechanism for the transmission of ideas of modernity, be it political regimes or 
                                            
1414 Li, Haizheng, “Higher Education in China: Compliment or Competition to 
US Universities?” in Clotfelter, Charles, ed. American Universities in a Global 
Market, National Bureau of Economic Research, (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2010). 
15 Lieberthal, 123. 
 12 
economic systems.”16 In the absence of these linkages, the differences in ideas on 
political governance and economic organization that developed in isolation of one 
another have been so dramatic that their effects are reflected in measurably different 
cognitive processes.17    
 There is, therefore, precedence for the notion presented here: that universities 
are powerful political actors. An education, once obtained, cannot be taken back. Chinese 
society has been transformed in a very short period of time from a highly coercive 
ideological society where scholarly inclinations were looked down upon and often 
severely punished, to one in which academic success provides a central gateway of access 
to middle class status. In thirty-some years, the Chinese higher education system has 
been transformed, from literally non-existence in 1977, to the largest higher education 
system in the world in 2011. What is more, the bulk of this change has taken place only in 
the last ten years.18  
 While it was revolutionary, in 1978, for Deng Xiaoping to send 3,000 Chinese 
students to study abroad, by 2006, there were 134,000 Chinese students doing so.19 
China is now home to 98.3 million college graduates, and the government is determined 
to grow that number to 195 million by 2020. That’s a 98% increase over ten years.20 In 
                                            
16 Kapur, Davesh, Diaspora, Development and Democracy: the domestic 
impact of international migration (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2010), 126. 
17 Nisbett, Richard E. The Geography of Thought: How Asians and Westerners 
Think Differently – and Why. (New York: Free Press, 2004)   
18 Zakaria, Fareed, “The new Challenge from China,” Time, October 07, 2010.  
19 Mu, Eric, “1978: Red China sent “pupils” to the capitalist world” DanWei, 
June 23, 
2008,http://www.danwei.org/scholarship_and_education/insert_caption_here_
links_and_1.phpl; Li, Haizheng, 269. 
20 Wang, Huiyao, “China’s Talent Plan” Brookings Institute Presentation, 
2010-09-20. 
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the past three years alone, enrollments have more than doubled.21 When the strategies to 
develop this system were implemented, few people could have foreseen the changes that 
would take place –even Deng himself lacked an overall plan. Instead, the CCP proceeded 
through a constant process of experimentation and adjustment.22 Political institutions 
were in a state of crisis. CCP leaders implemented those changes they thought necessary 
in order to maintain political legitimacy after the disasters of the late Mao years. These 
reforms set in motion other forces to which the CCP had to respond throughout the 
1980s. By the 1990s, reform had had so many unintended consequences that the need to 
cope with these growing complexities increasingly drove policy forward. 
 How has this affected current higher education policy in China? As reforms 
brought rapid economic growth, more groups were empowered by the growing wealth in 
China. The demands of governance grew in complexity – but good governance requires 
accurate information, which was scarce. To cope, think tanks were established in 1980 by 
Deng’s protégé Zhao Ziyang to help inform policy and guide reforms from Beijing. By 
1981, they had become instrumental drivers behind some of China’s most significant 
agricultural reforms, such as the full de-communization of agriculture and a return to 
family farming.  According to Lieberthal, “no other reform so significantly affected the 
lives and livelihoods of so many people.” The Party had begun to understand the 
importance of accurate information and expert opinion in formulating successful public 
policy.  
 Throughout the 1980s, the Party’s emphasis on higher education as a 
qualification for influence continued to rise. As Beijing sought to salvage itself by 
replacing old local-level Party blood with new, there was such dramatic turnover in 
                                            
21 Su, Baoren, “China’s Leisure Education: Problem, Analysis and Solutions – a 
Case Study of College Students in Hangzhou” Journal of Contemporary China 
Vol. 19, No. 66, July 2010: 719-733.  
22 Shambaugh.   
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leadership that by 1984, roughly 98% of cadres in China’s leading bodies of governance 
had been promoted since 1979.23 These changes sought to raise the educational levels of 
decision-makers throughout the system. The quality of education, however, remained a 
huge problem. For thirty years, the education system had actively shunned scholarship 
and selected against rational thought. The most educated segments of society had been 
purged, and China faced a severe shortage of information, talent and educators. Even 
today, quality control remains a central challenge, and this has been a central policy 
issue since the 1990s.24  
 In 2010, China inaugurated a new Talent Plan, which states unambiguously that 
the Party believes its future is tied to the academic quality of its higher educational 
institutions. Having pledged to raise spending on higher education to 4% of GDP by 
2012, the plan lists six categories of talent that the government will help cultivate. 
Political leaders and officials were top of that list.25 The CCP is emphasizing higher 
education as a qualification for leadership at the same time as Chinese universities are 
becoming increasingly integrated with the international market, and are growing in 
sophistication, having tried to conform to international standards of academic inquiry.26  
 As Thelen has shown, however, institutions can never do just one thing, in the 
sense of having their intended effects and only their intended effects. “Institutions,” she 
finds, “are created in a context marked by multiple and simultaneous functional and 
                                            
23 Lieberthal, 129, 127, 141, 161 
24 For more information on the quality challenges of higher education in China 
see Kristoff, Nick, “China’s Winning Schools?” The New York Times, January 
15, 2011 
25 Wang, Brookings Presentation, 2010.   
26 Haizheng Li has studied the rapidly growing integration between Chinese and 
American tertiary education institutions (TEIs) and found that, as it continues to build 
and develop, China’s higher education will likely be shaped by its “relationship with the 
outside world, especially the US.” 26 In fact, “given the large number of Chinese students 
studying in the US, it is clear that American Universities play a significant role in 
providing higher education to Chinese students, especially in graduate education.” See Li 
Haizheng, 291.  
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political demands. As a consequence, institutions designed to serve one set of interests 
often become ‘carriers’ of others as well.”27 The Chinese political system remains a work-
in-progress, and the structure of its institutions of governance are still being worked out.  
 As it continues to develop its economy, political structure and education system, 
China is writing its own theories of development. While Western ideas on development 
and governance draw heavily on Western academic tradition and philosophy, China is 
developing its own ideas by considering Western suggestions in the context of its own 
history and philosophic tradition.28 Social remittances from foreign-educated returnees 
in the form of Western ideas on governance interact with the Chinese domestic 
experience and on-the-ground reality.  
 The Chinese state is made up of individuals, all of whom are only human. The 
challenges of development are great for any country, and China’s leaders have had to 
navigate a highly complex society with very little guidance. Faced with an uncertain 
future, a rapidly changing society, and a convergence of unparalleled challenges such as 
global warming, food scarcity, and international security, it appears China’s top leaders 
are trying their best to foster modernity and development without yet again disrupting 
the social order. 29 Based on the interactions between elite national decision-making and 
                                            
27 Thelen, Kathleen, How Institutions Evolve: the political economy of skills in 
germany, Britain, the United States and Japan, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004).  
28 See Bell, Daniel, East Meets West: Human Rights and Democracy in East 
Asia, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Sevensson, Marina, 
Debating Human Rights in China: a Conceptual and Political History 
(Maryland: Rowman&Littlefield Publishers, inc, 2002); Chen, Cheng, The 
Prospects for Liberal Nationalism in Post-Leninist States,(Pennsylvania: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007); Dittmer, Lowell and Samuel Kim, 
eds. China’s Quest for National Identity, (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 
1993).     
29 As psychologists Sheena S. Iyengar and Mark R. Leppar at Stanford 
University have shown, not every society relates to choice in the same way. 
Indeed, individuals having grown up in an Eastern country such as China 
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knowledge developed in the university, this study suggests that the reformers currently 
in power at the top appear to operate on the assumption that, if the party-state can only 
reign in rising housing and food costs, stem the widening gap between rich and poor, and 
develop adequate institutions of governance to manage China’s increasingly complex 
society, it might just stand a chance of transforming China into a sustainable, powerful 
state in the modern era.  
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO:  
Literature Review 
 
 
“Political Scientists should drop preconceived notions and treat China as terra nova, 
strange, perhaps even exotic, but deserving of ground-up theoretical analysis.” 
-Roderick MacFarquhar, Harvard University30  
 
 
 
 
 Hidden from view, the internal workings of China’s political system remain 
poorly understood. While the literature acknowledges that there are forces for reform 
acting under the surface of the Chinese political system, it is vague on the subject of what 
those forces may be, or which among them have power to affect change. While education 
is sometimes discussed as an important dimension of the Chinese state and society, the 
literature neither acknowledges that China’s current engagement with higher education 
could become a significant source of unintended consequences for the political system, 
nor considers what those consequences may be.    
                                                                                                                                  
may “possess a more interdependent model of the self” than “American 
individualists.” While this does not dispute the fact that all humans want to 
be free, and “universal values” exist, it does suggest a strong cultural lens 
through which ideas must be filtered, p. 305.  
30 MacFarquhar, Roderick, “Study China!” in Gary King, Kay Lehman 
Schlozman, Norman H. Nie, eds, The Future of Political Science: 100 
Perspectives” (New York: Routledge, 2009), 190.  
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 In State and Society in 21st Century China, editors Gries and Rosen find that 
“after two decades of dramatic economic and social change, the political system in China 
is under increasing pressure to change.” Faced with rising popular protest, rural 
joblessness, growing tax resistance and evasion, popular groups like the Falun Gong, the 
rise of new political parties such as the China Democracy Party and the China Labor 
Bulletin, or difficult Han-minority relations, the contemporary leadership often seems 
unsure of how to proceed and reacts with drastic policy reversals. Its use of force can be 
excessive and unpredictable.  
 In the aftermath of market-oriented economic reforms, the authors stress how 
the CCP is far from a unitary actor, and therefore is not capable of strategic choice and 
coordinated behavior. In contrast to “the decidedly Liberal notion of a David society 
fighting valiantly against a Goliath state,” Gries and Rosen argue that “state” and 
“society” in China should be re-conceptualized as plural “states” and “societies,” to 
account for the fact that they “can and often do form alliances with each other and 
against other political groups.”  While China is no democracy, Chinese popular opinion 
appears to be gaining influence as “the Chinese people – peasants, workers, students – 
are increasingly contesting the legitimacy of the current regime.”31  
 In Fragile Superpower: How China’s Internal Politics Could Derail Its Rise, 
Shirk observes “China’s leaders face a troubling paradox. The more developed the 
country becomes, the more insecure and threatened they feel. The PRC today is a brittle 
authoritarian regime that fears its own citizens and can only bend so far to accommodate 
the demands of foreign governments.”32 While the CCP has maintained its position in the 
single-Party state, the practical applications of its power have become increasingly 
                                            
31 Gries, Hays Peter and Stanley Rosen, eds. State and Society in 21st Century 
China: Crisis, Contention, and Legitimation (New York and London: 
Routledge Curzon, 2004), 2, 5. 
32 Shirk, Susan, Competitive Comrades: Career Incentives and Student 
Strategies in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 5. 
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difficult as society grows in complexity. In Back-Alley Banking: Private Entrepreneurs 
in China, Tsai examined the workings of informal finance in Chinese businesses to 
expose the de facto limits to the CCP’s day-to-day domestic power. Not only did she find 
“the disjuncture between official state regulations and the popularity of informal 
financial capacity of the state in China is not as strong as one might expect, given its 
authoritarian mode of governance,” but also, “instead of institutional isomorphism, there 
is remarkable institutional diversity” across China’s many localities.33   
 Heberer, Schubert and Li have similarly argued that the depth of political change 
since the 1978 reform era may be underestimated in the literature. They say, 
respectively, that the political structural reform, or zhengzhi tizhi gai ge  
(政治体制改革) initiated by Deng at the start of reforms, and the more recent move to 
build “intra-party democracy”, or dangnei minzhu (党内民主) within the CCP suggest a 
complex political reality with many parts in motion.34 Heberer and Schubert ventured 
“to call China’s reform path unique.”35 The forces that perpetually drive policy forward 
are many and, as such, it may be less clear where true power lies in the Chinese state. 
Clearly, the will of the CCP plays a role, as does the economy, but which forces hold the 
ultimate power over political outcomes remains a contentious issue.  
 Apart from the literature on China specifically, in Economic Origins of 
Dictatorship and Democracy, Acemoglu and Robinson use game theory to model how 
some countries become democratic while others do not and offer some broad-scale 
insights on the process of democratic transition. Their argument relies on two 
assumptions: 1) people behave strategically, and therefore individuals’ and groups’ 
                                            
33 Tsai, Kellee S. Back-alley Banking: Private Entrepreneurs in China (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2002), 5. 
34 Li, Cheng, “Intra-Party Democracy in China: Should We Take it Seriously?”  
35 Heberer, Thomas, and Gunter Schubert, “Political Reform and Regime 
Legitimacy in Contemporary China” ASIAN 99, April 2006, 10. 
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preferences over regimes are derived from the economic and social consequences of 
these regimes for their interests, and 2) “politics is inherently conflictual,” therefore 
groups will inevitably have opposing interests. Their study focuses on social groups as 
key political actors, due to the authors’ “sense that most important forces in political 
conflict and change are groups of individuals.” Thus, leaving aside issues of political 
philosophy related to how a just or fair society should reconcile the conflicting 
preferences between groups, in practice, political conflict is resolved in favor of those 
who hold political power. The authors distinguish between de jure political power and 
de facto political power, and invoke Hobbes’ state of nature to make their point on how 
allocations are determined in the absence of strong democratic institutions. In Hobbes’ 
state of nature, they explain, “if there is a fruit that can be consumed by one of two 
individuals, which one will get it? The answer is clear: because there is no law, whoever 
is more powerful, whoever has more brute force, will get to eat the fruit. The same type 
of brute force matters in the political arena as well.” 
 In the absence of strong institutions of governance, de facto political power 
prevails. This the authors describe as “the first source of political power” or “simply what 
a group can do to other groups and the society at large by using force.” Sometimes, 
however, political power can be allocated by the political system. In this case, political 
institutions refer to the social and political arrangements that allocate de jure political 
power, such as electoral rule. The distinction between de jure and de facto power in 
states suggests the “major role of democracy is its ability to allocate de jure political 
power.”36 Where institutions are weak, however, the sources of de jure political power 
may face more challenge from possible counter currents of de facto political power, as 
                                            
36 Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship 
and Democracy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 21, 22.  
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changing realities continue to empower new groups who raise new challenges for the 
standing regime.  
 The tension between de jure and de facto political power in the Chinese state 
resonates within the contrasting views of Shambaugh and Pei on the political future of 
the Chinese state. Transformative economic growth over the past three decades has 
meant that political outcomes in China are now shaped by a multiplicity of actors 
battling out their interests within an opaque, weakly institutionalized, political system. 
Where one assigns relative agency within this mélange will affect the conclusions one 
draws about the political future of the Chinese state. In China’s Communist Party: 
Atrophy and Adaptation, Shambaugh ultimately places agency on the side of de facto 
power. He argues that while “it is evident from a wide variety of indicators that the CCP, 
as an institution, has been in a state of progressive decline in terms of its control over 
various aspects of the intellectual, social, economic and political life of the nation,” the 
CCP is “definitely not awaiting the inevitable collapse of its power.” This, he believes, is 
because the CCP is so “keenly aware that implosion is one possibility,” that its leaders 
and cadres have calculated the only way to avoid such a terminal fate is through 
“introspection, adaptation, and implementation of preemptive reforms and policies.” 
While “many Western analysts seem to believe that if reforms are not protodemocratic, 
they are not valid,” Shambaugh points out that recent reforms, albeit aimed at 
strengthening the CCP’s hold on power rather than replacing it, reflect important 
changes in the relative distribution of political power the Chinese political system.  
 The CCP, says Shambaugh, “has zero interest in transitioning to a Western, or 
even Asian, democratic system of competitive parties.” Yet, to strengthen its rule and 
achieve its goal of remaining in power as a single ruling party, the CCP understands that 
the society over which it rules has grown so complex that not even its current 
combination of economic growth, nationalism, and coercion will be sufficient to survive 
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in the long run. To cope, he argues, the CCP has had to continually reform and adapt to 
the times, such that “addressing the needs of different constituencies within the nation” 
has become a key component of the CCP’s legitimacy. According to this view, the 
incentive to preempt the demands of emergent interest groups will drive the CCP to 
continually adapt and reform in order to consolidate its power.  The Party may be an 
agent of change, but it is not a driver. Gradually, the Chinese political system will change 
as “the party finds itself coping with a constant cycle of reform-readjust-reform-
readjust.” The cycle continues as “each set of reforms triggers certain consequences 
(some expected, others unexpected) that in turn cause readjustments and further 
reforms.”  
 In an effort that seems to invoke the Chinese concept of enlightened rule, or 
zhexuewang (哲学王), the CCP appears to be trying to transform itself “from a classic 
Leninist party into a new kind of hybrid party.”37  As it remains “engaged in a historically 
unprecedented political experiment,” the CCP has become an “eclectic state” that 
borrows culture by “scanning the globe for appropriate models and ideas that could be 
imported and grafted onto indigenous roots.” 38 Unlike the image of an unaccountable 
rulership that maintains power through various forms of coercion, Shambaugh describes 
a strangely studious state. Having been “learning not only negative lessons from former 
communist party-states but also positive lessons from noncommunist political systems,” 
it has been designing its policies accordingly. The CCP leaders tend to govern with a 
strong sense of history and long-term perspective. To maintain power, Shambaugh 
believes the CCP will unwittingly continue reforming based on a cycle driven by the de 
                                            
37 Shambaugh, 3,4,6. 
38 This has been the case for more then a century since the Self-Strengthening 
Movement of the 1870s, and will be a crucial point as this study continues; 
Shambaugh, 6.  
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facto power of public pressure.39 Thus, there is “an inexorable dynamic in which the 
party is simultaneously proactive and reactive, and is only partially in control of its own 
fate.”40   
 Pei, in contrast, suggests the CCP maintains sufficient power to act in its own 
self-interest while suppressing opposition. While the Party has doubtlessly adapted, he 
distinguishes between liberal adaptation and illiberal adaptation and argues that “the 
rising tensions between an authoritarian regime and an increasingly pluralist society” 
have been largely resolved through illiberal adaptations that “maximize control of the 
state’s repressive apparatus and growing economic resources to develop, refine and 
implement more subtle and effective means of maintaining political control.”  
 In the Chinese context, illiberal adaptation consists of “strictly limited political 
reform, selective repression, improved technical capacities for dealing with social unrest 
and emerging technological challenges, and co-optation of new social elites.” While the 
Chinese state has moved “from one that was once tightly controlled by the state, into one 
that is increasingly autonomous, pluralistic and complex” and, as such, governance is 
increasingly complicated, the CCP is in control, and no other groups possess true agency 
to drive political change. He sees the growing influence of university graduates as co-
optation of the intelligentsia –evidence that the Party has been systematically “enticing 
the intelligentsia’s younger generation into its ranks.”41 In this approach, which is 
distinctly top-down, Pei largely ignores unintended consequences. His is a CCP fully in 
                                            
39 The first sentence of a recent Economist issue, with a cover story on “The 
Dangers of a Rising China,” was: “Towards the end of 2003 and early 2004 
China’s most senior leaders put aside the routine of governing 1.3 billion 
people to spend a couple of afternoons studying the rise of great powers.”39 
Examining the developing international relationship between the United 
States and China, the article continued, “the best way to turn China into an 
opponent is to treat it as one.” See The Economist, December 2, 2010.    
40 Shambaugh, 104.  
41 Pei, Minxin, China’s Trapped Transition: the Limits of Developmental 
Autocracy (Boston: First Harvard University Press, 2006), 81, 1, 91.  
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control. Pei notes “it is hard to deny that the party’s efforts to recruit highly educated 
members appeared to have had a significant impact on the composition of the party. By 
1999, nearly 20 percent of the CCP members claimed to have received college or college-
equivalent education, almost six times the national average.” Yet, Pei interprets these 
changes to suggest CCP power over individuals and assigns little agency to the individual 
him or herself.  
 A second point of diversion between the views of Pei and Shambaugh is the 
relative institutional strength assigned to the Party. Pei’s description of the illiberal 
adaptations that ensure only “limited political opening” in CCP controlled China paints 
the image of a highly sophisticated institution capable of Orwellian-style supervision and 
control. Given the relative youth of CCP institutions, the findings of Gries, Rosen and 
Tsai, and the extent of decentralization in the Chinese system, Pei’s view may 
oversimplify realities of governance in the reform-era. Moreover, Pei’s analysis leaves no 
space for diverse interests among China’s elite, while economic realities suggest this 
group may be surprisingly dynamic.42 The speed of growth in modern China has created 
many new pathways for entry into the elite and strengthened a growing middle class. 
These two groups are likely to complicate the elite/mass dichotomy that underlies much 
of Pei’s analysis. In particular, the emergence of a new middle class may have profound 
political implications. 
 Acemoglu and Robinson find that political reorganization can often follow 
changes in the relative strengths of different social groups that result from changing 
economic realities of the time. In the Chinese case, this economic perspective may be 
particularly instructive. The authors suggest “democracy emerges in response to a 
serious revolutionary threat or significant social unrest. The middle class can be the 
                                            
42 For more on these dynamics, see Yang, Guobin, The Power of the Internet in 
China: Citizen Activism Online (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).   
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driver in this process by playing a key role in the revolutionary movement or by fueling 
and maintaining it.” In addition to its role as driver of political movements, they believe 
the middle class can also play the important role of buffer in the conflict between elites 
and citizens. 43 Now that higher education has become, in the larger international 
knowledge economy as well as in the Chinese case, an important distinguishing feature 
of the middle class, it is possible that current trends in the Chinese political economy 
could both empower a fast-growing middle class, and slightly blur the lines between 
middle class and elite by acting as a pathway for mobility between these groups. The 
strong economic advancement of the middle class may have muted the desire for 
political revolution within that group.  
 Most observers, like Pei, believe that “a democratic transition under the rule of 
the CCP…seems a distant, or even unrealistic, prospect,” and yet Li has challenged the 
very framework for such analysis by pointing out that “democracy is a historical process 
and a matter of degree.” 44 Li says, “it is important to remember that democratic political 
institutions vary greatly from place to place and across time.” While “no one should 
expect China to develop a multiparty system in the near future…this should not obscure 
the significant changes that have taken place both in the leadership’s perceptions about 
the desirability of democracy and in the Chinese political system itself.” Advocating for a 
greater contextualization of Chinese political structures within their longer history, he 
argues that, “if western scholars hope to assess the prospects for democratization in 
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revolutionary movements were led by middle-class actors and, more 
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example, the uprisings that helped induce the First Reform Act in Britain or 
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44 Pei, 7 
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China, they obviously need to understand the Chinese view of democracy, as well as the 
political agenda of Chinese leaders.” 45 
 In China’s Changing Political Landscape: Prospects for Democracy, Li explored 
these topics further, by gathering insights of fifteen prominent China scholars to evaluate 
the future trajectory of China’s political developments. In response to his central 
question: ‘can democracy emerge in China through incremental, systematic change?’ he 
unsurprisingly received a wide array of responses. While some contributors saw in 
emerging trends and institutional developments a potential path to democratic 
transformation, others were either more pessimistic about the likelihood of peaceful 
transition, or believed that incremental changes may simply strengthen one-party rule by 
making the Party more resilient and adaptable.46 DeLisle, for example, argued that the 
rise of law or “legalization” in reform-era China “is not meant to advance, and has not 
been advancing, democracy.” Instead, rule by law and the growth of the legal system 
“have substituted for democracy and postponed effective democratization.” At the same 
time, DeLisle noted potential weakness in the Party as, “in some areas, demand and 
supply are growing, or threatening to grow, beyond the leadership’s expectations and 
preferences.”47  
 The CCP is no longer all-powerful, if it ever was. The pressures for political 
reform in the Chinese state are strong and growing more powerful. The question, 
therefore, is not whether reformers exist, but whether they will have the power to carry 
out the reforms envisioned. On balance it appears that as they grow more populous, the 
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forces pushing for reform may gain leverage against entrenched interests of the Party. 
There is, however, an un-addressed gap in the literature: if ever a political transition 
towards democracy could occur in China, from where might the impulse come?   
 Kapur’s findings may offer an idea. He has studied globalization trends to suggest 
that, in addition to cross-border flows of goods, services and financial capital, ideational 
flows stemming from human migration, and study-abroad in particular, form a “third leg 
of the globalization triad” and “are likely to play an equally influential role in shaping the 
political and economic landscape over the next fifty years.”48  
 As Li has suggested, there is a tendency within the literature to forget that the 
principles of justice, life and liberty upon which the American political system was 
founded in 1789, were echoes of a French Revolution before it. The Declaration of 
Independence stands on a legacy of Western political thought. Governments, it says, are 
nothing but systems instituted among men to secure and protect their individual rights. 
They derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. Far from self-evident, 
these were ideas worked out over a long process of reasoning and debate on the morality 
of governance.49  Building an effective government, in effect, is not so simple. 50 Even 
America’s founding fathers, well versed in the classics of Western thought, had trouble. 51 
What institutions could perfectly imbibe the principles America was founded upon? The 
realities of governance reveal gaps between theory and practice. There are many interest 
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49 See Locke, Hobbs, Rousseau, Mill and Kant in Sandel, Michael J. Justice: 
What’s the Right Thing to Do? (New York: Farrar, Straus and Girous, 2009).    
50 This is currently the subject of really fascinating research at the Stanford 
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Democracy,” Time Asia, April 16, 2005.   
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groups to accommodate, and toes to avoid stepping on. The Federalist papers reflect 
heated contention –and the fundamental theoretical underpinnings of the American 
system had, at that point, already been worked out.  
 In China, this is less the case. Working within a legacy of Confucian thought,  
Chinese thinkers and policy-makers clearly no longer believe the principles of ren  
(人) and li (礼) alone can make government strong.52 And yet, no obvious alternatives 
exist.  It is unclear the CCP could adopt perfectly American-style institutions even if it 
wanted to. China is a huge country in the midst of tumultuous change, and institution 
building is a difficult process without a roadmap.53 Moreover, none of the essential 
underpinnings of such a system exist: Judeo-Christian belief systems aren’t there; the 
institutional legacies of Greece and Rome, experience of the Enlightenment, the French 
Revolution, British redistributions of power, each of which shaped Western beliefs on 
governance, are absent in China. Instead, replace all of the above with a rich 
philosophical tradition of filial piety and ancestor worship, a long history of dynastic 
cycle, a half-baked May Fourth Movement, a slew of humiliating defeats by foreign 
powers, a vague and brief stint at democracy (the legacy of which remains a constant 
source of irritation in the form of Taiwan) and Maoism. Add to this mix a sense of 
national pride that considers the Chinese civilization to be great, and cultural traditions 
that remind each Chinese child from whence he or she came along with the responsibility 
that entails.54 Mao promised that China would stand up, and finally it is rising again.55  
                                            
52 The principles of ren （人）and li （礼）are commonly associated with 
Confucian thought. While translated in many ways, ren is generally 
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 Too often, literature seeks to understand and explain China by cramming it into 
categories of Western design. And yet, China is unfamiliar.56 It is governed by a complex 
patchwork of leaders, each accountable to different pressures and hierarchies.57 While 
institutions and proper pathways of governments exist, the rules that govern them are 
unclear, malleable, and often conflicting.58 Still, China is forced into frameworks of 
nationhood and regime type that, on further inquiry, appear not only out of step, but 
deeply incompatible with its reality.59 The problem here is that comparative politics 
cannot truly be whittled down to a science. Technical terms are constructed to create a 
precise definition of what something is, along with what it is not. Often, they feed into a 
dichotomy: the opposite of a capitalist state is a communist one; the opposite of 
democratic is authoritarian – but the world does not exist in such clear compartments. 
There are capitalist states with more social redistribution and than others, and 
communist states that embrace the market. In governments, as in human bodies, there 
are grey areas, and unknowns.  
                                                                                                                                  
55 Mishra, Pankaj, “Mao and the Maoists” The New Yorker, December 20, 
2010.  
56 See McFarquar quotation at the top of this chapter.  
57 The strength of institutions in the Party are so weak that individuals 
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 These are categories of Western construction, and a growing tide of scholars 
agree China doesn’t fit the mold.60 Even the philosophical roots of its social contract are 
foreign: Americans, endowed by their Creator with the concept of unalienable rights, 
theoretically choose to enter into society and consent to be governed. In that way, the 
government is given rights from the people, who received them along with humanity at 
birth.61 In China, the government receives its right to rule from the mandate of heaven 
or tian (天), which is theoretically conditional upon good governance. Rights are then 
handed down, conceptually speaking, from the government to the governed.62 While 
Aristotle said the best constitution was the one with the most moralizing laws, Confucius 
dismissed laws and said rulers should govern though principles of virtue and ritual. 
When Americans rose up in revolution to demand freedom from Britain, they hoped to 
build a moral system of governance by enshrining their principles of justice in law.63 
When China had its people’s revolution, however, its leader sought to build a new moral 
order through a ‘virtuocracy’ designed to transform society at the level of the individual 
himself.64  
 Now, China is no longer the insular place it once was. Revolutions in technology, 
international trade, study-abroad and others, all at breakneck speed, have transformed 
China’s political system –and CCP leaders understand this.65 In fact, they often behave as 
though paranoid by it.66 The Chinese, it seems, don’t trust their institutions any more 
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than foreign observers do. Possibly, they trust them less.67  By examining a small aspect 
of higher education within elite social science and law departments, as well as the way 
social scientists are increasingly interacting with various arms of the Chinese 
government through think tanks, this study addresses some outstanding questions on 
ideational flows that might underpin future challenges to the Chinese status quo.   
 As human beings, we are constantly learning and changing throughout our lives. 
Every new experience or piece of information shapes how we think and view the world 
around us.68 In China, realities of life are changing daily and all of these changes affect 
the national psychological makeup, which differs starkly across society’s age 
demographics. Higher education is simply one facet of these changes. Higher education 
presents a unique sphere for freedom of inquiry and critical thinking and a central site 
for cross-cultural exchanges on politics and governance. This study will begin to address 
the perceived gap in the literature on what the unintended consequences of the current 
higher education drive may be. How will the internationally educated Chinese elite 
influence China’s political system? 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE:  
Historical Background and Current Landscape 
 
 
“When our thousands of Chinese students abroad return home, you will see how China 
will transform itself.” 
                                            
67 Demick, March 5, 2011. 
68 See, Iyengar, Sheena S. and Mark R. Lepper, “Rethinking the Value of 
Choice: A Cultural Perspective on Intrinsic Motivation” Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 1999, Vol. 76, No. 3, 349; Nisbett, Richard E, The 
Geography of Thought: How Asians and Westerners Think Differently…and 
Why (New York: Free Press, 2003), xvii.  
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-Deng Xiaoping69 
 
“In the era of globalization, higher education in most countries is not isolated. This is 
especially the case for China as it becomes more integrated into the world.” 
-Li Haizheng 70 
 
 
 China has a long and rich history of higher education. While the system has 
undergone many transformations since the demise of the Qing dynasty at the turn of the 
twentieth century, and the massive expansion of universities based on an American 
model is certainly unprecedented, there are features, such as the political role of 
intellectuals, that have endured over time. This chapter briefly outlines how higher 
education has historically interacted with Chinese political decision-making in 
traditional Chinese history. It then explores the university as an institution itself, with a 
strong power to socialize individual actors within it and the growing role of think tanks. 
Finally, this chapter suggests how these combined aspects of higher education make it 
receptive to ideational flows between nations in the global economy.   
 
3.1: The History of Intellectuals in Modern China   
 Elite intellectual activity has long played a role in Chinese politics. Historically, 
the Chinese literati were instrumental to evaluating the emperor’s claims to legitimacy. 
As interpreters of the political classics and custodians of the “Mandate of Heaven,” the 
literati were uniquely placed to challenge the emperor’s legitimacy claims, and they often 
did. Rulers in imperial China needed the literati’s approval in order to wield power, so 
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much so that Weber characterized them as an independent status group with a legal-
rational authority of their own. 71 
 Arguably, this traditional role has continued through the post-revolutionary 
period. Modern Chinese intellectuals maintain the functions of the traditional literati, 
but also engage with an increasingly wide array of scholarly influence. When Western-
style universities first began to emerge in China during the nationalist period in the early 
twentieth century, they became important receptors for new waves of political thought 
imported from the west.72 Powerful theories of democracy, socialism and Marxism 
filtered in from Europe, Japan and Russia and blended with more traditional Chinese 
philosophies to create a rich intellectual environment. These mixed influences are visible 
in both Sun Yat-Sen’s democratic doctrine and Marxism under Mao.73 When Mao came 
to power, however, he understood the literati’s power to check his own, and attacked 
them persistently.  Intellectuals were demoted from “literati”, or shidaifu (士大夫), to the 
“stinking ninth class”, or choujiuceng (臭九层). Still, they never truly lost influence over 
political legitimacy. Gries and Rosen point out that, “if the use of force to silence 
intellectuals during periods like the Anti-rightist Movement of the late 1950s signaled 
reversions to coercive forms of power, they did not fundamentally alter the role of 
Chinese intellectuals as the custodians of the “Mandate of Heaven.”” Leaders from Mao, 
Deng Xiaoping and Li Peng, to the party elders who decided to set tanks upon students 
in Tiananmen Square, may have used force to assert power, but as is evident from their 
earlier willingness to meet with Wuer Kaixi and other student leaders during the Beijing 
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Spring “they also recognized the continuing role of intellectuals in legitimizing the 
regime.”74  
 Since that time, the Party’s relationship with intellectuals has continued to 
evolve. When Deng came to power in the late 1970s and greatly improved the economic 
and sociopolitical status of intellectuals, he saw no need to consult think tanks when 
making decisions.75 Yet, it was at this time that think tanks were first re-established in 
modern China to help bridge the information gap and inform policy. These were 
established in 1981 by Deng’s protégé Zhao Ziyang, who was working from Beijing to 
develop new agricultural reforms. While their power stemmed exclusively from close 
personal contact with Zhao himself, these think tanks were instrumental to designing 
one of the most fundamental initiatives of the reform era. Based on their advice, Zhang 
initiated a process leading to full decommunization of agriculture and a return to family 
farming. 76 
 While Pei believes the recent rehabilitation of intellectuals reflects a “co-optation 
of the intelligentsia” to appease them from mounting further protest to the continued 
power of the regime, Shambaugh’s framework suggests a different motive, whereby the 
CCP depends on this new group of intellectual leaders to help it adapt policies well 
enough designed to sidestep any challenges to its power that may otherwise arise.77 This 
analysis tends to side with Shambaugh on intentionality, but remains skeptical regarding 
the effectiveness of such a policy. While think tanks may help CCP leaders form 
enlightened policy at the apex, this study suggests that i) ideational flows may result in 
different scholarly preferences than the CCP may expect, and ii) implementation 
challenges are likely to frustrate these efforts in practice. Moreover, the growing power of 
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the highly educated is likely to feed into the cycle of atrophy and adaptation in the CCP 
as it not only benefits from the skills of, but must continually meet the demands and 
expectations of, the expanded educated middle class and elite.  
 
3.2: The Socialization Power of Universities   
 
 As social animals, we are influenced by the world around us, and institutions, 
especially those geared towards education, are uniquely designed to influence our 
behavior. By determining incentive structures in an enclosed environment, universities 
have tremendous socialization effects on students who pass though their walls during 
their formative years.78  
 This socialization aspect of higher education has been particularly intense in 
modern Chinese education history. In the 1970s, Shirk used an institutional perspective 
to understand complex patterns of behavior among Chinese students and found links 
“back to the principle of educational selection and job promotion employed by the 
revolutionary regime.” This society of thirty years ago, from which current Party 
leadership emerged, operated based on highly distorted incentive structures that deeply 
shaped individual behavior. 79  
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 For reasons of social transformation, mass mobilization for economic 
development, political consolidation and legitimization in the new Maoist regime, the 
CCP had adjusted selection-criterion to model a “virtuocracy.”80  Power-holding elites 
used the virtue standard “to promote their loyal supports and demote those who are 
potential threats,” while the wider Chinese population, who were primarily peasants and 
workers and “did poorly under the old meritocratic or feudocratic rules,” initially 
believed virtuocracy would improve their chances to get ahead. 81 Yet the virtuocratic 
institutions ultimately resulted in powerful unintended effects as “vague and subjective 
standards of virtuocratic selection,” ultimately “alienated citizens from one another and 
from the political system.” The result was “widespread social distrust and political 
cynicism.”82  
 While Shirk’s work is now dated, it seems possible that the legacy of these 
incentive structures may persist as deep currents in the contemporary Chinese education 
system, passed on subconsciously from one generation to another.83   Writing in The 
New Yorker, Osnos has reported the extent to which contemporary Chinese remain 
                                            
80 Shirk, Competitive Comrades, 1, 9, 11.  
81Thus, “distribution of rewards according to virtue became a central element 
in the Chinese revolutionary leaders’ strategy of social transformation, 
development mobilization, and political legitimization, which together formed 
a coherent alternative to Western capitalist strategy and came to be called by 
Western observers ‘the Maoist model.”   
82 Shirk, Competitive Comrades,11, 12.  
83 When one generation is socialized to behave a certain way, the next 
generation is likely to feel psychological reverberations as well. Interestingly, 
as affluence rises, China’s middle classes are increasingly searching for 
psychological help, and psychology is becoming increasingly popular as a field 
of analysis. Osnos reported that “when Beijing University held a series of 
lectures on Carl Jung a few years ago, it could admit only a quarter of the 
people who wanted to attend” See, Osnos, Evan, “Meet Dr. Freud: Does 
psychoanalysis have a future in an authoritarian state?” The New Yorker, 
January 10, 2011; For a fascinating, comprehensive survey of the these 
findings, see Brooks, David, “Social Animal: How the New Sciences of Human 
Nature Can Help Make Sense of a Life” The New Yorker, January 17, 2011.  
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psychologically marked. 84 At the same time, the history of modern China is still 
unfolding at breakneck speed and the reality of life experience continues to change at a 
barely imaginable rapid pace, which will continue to have psychological repercussions as 
societal norms change beneath everyone’s feet. 85 
 Having risen to the apex of this political system, China’s current leaders would 
have been particularly vulnerable to the psychological trauma one could imagine would 
arise from growing up in high-pressure spheres of Maoist society. Theirs is a powerful 
social history that, without having lived through it, seems difficult to relate to. When Jan 
Wong, a young Canadian who was one of only two foreigners who accepted and attended 
at Beijing University in the early 1970s, she was so overpowered by the university 
environment that she found herself participating in practices so coercive they haunted 
her well into adult life. 86  
  Nowadays, of course, life in Chinese college is greatly changed. Along with 
dramatic economic growth over the past ten years, of 7-8 % GDP growth per year, 
Chinese people’s living standards have advanced greatly and college students 
                                            
84 Kristoff, Nick and Sheryl WuDunn, China Wakes: The Struggle for the Soul 
of a Rising Power (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 63.  
85 Osnos, “Meet Dr. Freud,” The New Yorker, January 10, 2011, 57; Osnos 
observes that China’s recent economic rebirth has transformed China with 
“unprecedented wealth but also with radical change: history’s largest human 
migration sent a hundred and thirty million citizens to cities in search of jobs, 
and left almost sixty million growing up apart from one or both parents. An 
affluent new classes emerged, creating a gap between the rich and the poor 
that is approaching the size of America’s. Hundreds of local colleges opened 
across the country, producing more graduates than the economy could absorb, 
fuelling an atmosphere of brutal competition.” 
86 Wong, Jan, Beijing Confidential: A Tale of Comrades Lost and Found 
(Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 2007), Also see, Pomfret, John, Chinese Lessons: 
Five Classmates and the Story of the New China, (New York: Henry Holt and 
Co., 2006); Yang, Rae, Spider Eaters (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1997).  
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increasingly seek out leisure to become participants in ‘civil society’.87 As the lives of 
college students continue to adapt to changing economic realities, their demands are 
observably changing. If the CCP continues with the massification of its higher education 
system there will be unavoidable political consequences.88 There is an inherent tension 
between the economic motivation and political outcomes of higher education policy. On 
the one hand, the massive expansion of higher education credentials across the Chinese 
population may raise productivity, foster innovation and develop China’s international 
prestige. On the other, it could empower a huge group of young middle class aspirants 
who, armed with the self-assurance that comes with having a higher education degree, 
could disrupt political stability should their hopes outstrip opportunity.  
 Unavoidably, the successful Chinese economy is a powerful driver of higher 
education expansion.89 Su has documented how colleges and universities reflect an 
exaggerated image of evolving social trends towards the rise of leisure, and changing 
lifestyles across the Chinese population as a whole. As the next generation of leaders 
passes through university as a selection process for future access to resources, they are 
being exposed to a markedly different socialization process than any of the leadership 
before them. 
  
 
                                            
87 Su, 726; Su shows that the students’ monthly leisure expenditure is RMB 
485.53 on average, which is 68.6% of their average monthly expenditure of 
RMB 706.75.  
88 Recall that, having been in the process of rapid expansion since the 1990s, 
in the past three years alone, total enrolment has doubled and the 
participation rate has “jumped by more than 4% over 1998, to more than 
17%.” Beijing plans to raise education spending to four percent of GDP by 
2012 and hopes to transform China into a “creative and innovative economy 
by 2020.” Thus, the Chinese intend to increase total college-educated workers 
from 98.3 million in 2010, to 195 million by 2020. Brookings.   
89 Su, 720.  
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3.3: Ideational Flows  
Political thought is not created in a vacuum: it is part of a nation’s political life. 
-Chester Tan, Chinese Political Thought in the Twentieth Century 
 
 
 The socialization process is only one aspect of learning in universities. 
Universities can also be important sites of intellectual pursuit, and the ideas developed 
and passed down within them are similarly influenced by the university’s institutional 
structure. While the changes to Chinese scholarship that have occurred over the past 
century are ideational, and therefore intangible, they have been highly influential. Take 
Mao, for example. Few would question the depth of his influence over Chinese 
modernization process. Yet communism is itself an imported philosophy that similarly 
came to China through higher education flows. In fact, Mao was first exposed to the 
foreign ideas of Marx and Lenin while working in the library at Peking University. His 
philosophies on governance and moral reform reflect an intriguing mix of influence from 
both traditional Confucian thought and foreign imported philosophies. 90  
 In the current internationalized economy, in which it can be difficult for a 
Westerner to open a newspaper without encountering at least one story about China, it is 
easy to forget how limited ideational flows between China and the West had historically 
been. Until very recently, only a trickle of intellectual dialogue existed between China 
and the West.91 The influence and ideational flow is now expected to grow and an 
increased rate. To consider the potential for this, it is necessary to have an 
                                            
90 Tan, v.   
91 Not until the late 1800s did the first Chinese exchange students began 
traveling abroad for education –and, even then, they were few in number and 
communication barriers would have been great.91 The inflows of Western 
influence to China through trade and missionary work follow a similar 
timeline. Moreover, much communication was cut off during the Cold War 
era of Maoist rule. As a result of this mutual isolation, Chinese society has 
developed strikingly different intellectual frameworks from its Western 
counterparts. 
 39 
understanding of the current structure of the Chinese higher education system with its 
increasingly powerful international elite, top tier universities, and the growing number of 
Chinese engaged in study abroad.  
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: 
Current Structure of the Chinese Higher Education System  
 
 
“A strong nation depends heavily on  
first-class education and first-class human resources.” 
-“A blueprint for Educational Modernization,” Ministry of Education of the PRC 2010-07-31 
 
 
 
 
 The Chinese higher education system is designed to serve a multi-dimensional set 
of purposes that include: i) moving up the value-added chain in the global economy, ii) 
developing better institutions of governance with educated local officials who can help 
bolster the position of the party, and iii) asserting China’s place as an international 
intellectual center. Probably, the massive expansion serves to absorb and mediate the 
rising expectations of a rising middle class by providing a cooling effect within the 
system as well.92 To achieve this multiplicity of goals, the CCP developed a highly tiered 
system of higher education.93 While higher education is, almost by definition, a sorting 
process, and every system is tiered in terms of quality, the Chinese case is unique in that 
each tier is actually given a different mandate that corresponds to different freedoms.94  
                                            
92 Kapur, Devesh and Megan Crowley. “Beyond the ABCs: Higher Education in 
Developing Countries” Center for Global Development, Working Paper 139, 
Feb. 2008.  
93 In fact, the tiers are slightly more complex than the simple framework 
outlined here, but they do provide a general sense of the higher education 
landscape.  
94 Even within the 985 Project, each school is assigned a slightly different 
mandate.  
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 These tiers create a complex layering of resource allocation and determine the 
extent of free intellectual inquiry and influence afforded to the scholars therein. In 
general, this system can be broken down into three tiers: yiben (一本), erben (二本), and 
sanben (三本) daxue, whereby the top tier, or yiben daxue are elite public schools, meant 
as places where research is carried out; the second tier, or erben daxue, which constitute 
the bulk of the system, are public schools of lower prestige meant to be places for 
learning knowledge produced elsewhere; and the third tier, or sanben daxue, are 
accredited private institutions mostly dedicated to training students in a certain skill.95 
This section will first introduce the relevant policies that have contributed to the current 
organization of Chinese higher education, and then explore the Party’s expectations for 
top tier universities.   
 
4.1: The Three Tiered System 
 In 1993, the Ministry of Education declared the country would begin trying build 
“world-class universities” by concentrating state resources within a select few schools 
with promising programs. Under the “211 project,” under which took effect in 1995, the 
CCP selected 107 universities and 602 priority programs from 1,054 total universities in 
China to receive large amounts of special funding (RMB 18.37 billion Yuan/ $2.3 billion). 
Three years later, in 1998, President Jiang created a further layer to the hierarchy.  
Under the “985 project” 40 of 107 universities under the 211 project would be selected to 
receive additional special funding of between RMB 300 million to RMB 1.8 billion per 
school.96 While several other related projects, such as the “863 project” and “973 project” 
soon followed these first two, the “211 project” and “985 project” laid the crucial 
groundwork for the current structure of the system.   
                                            
95 Thanks to Wang Tinging for these insights.  
96 Li Haizheng, 278.  
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Figure One:97 
Tier Detail  Mandate  
Tier One,  
一本大学 
- Generally public 
universities  
- Extremely competitive 
admission  
- Selected by the 985 
project to receive 
additional funding  
- Selected to reflect 
highest quality, as well as 
a certain geographical 
distribution 
- Most deeply 
internationalized  
- Relatively free speech 
- Highest quality   
- Research and create knowledge 
- Raise China’s international 
prestige  
- Train a next generation of leaders 
able to guide China successfully 
through the challenges of the 21st 
century in all fields of the public 
and private sector  
 
Tier Two, 
二本大学 
- Generally public 
universities  
- Fairly competitive 
admission  
- Not as well funded as 
Tier One universities  
- Less internationalized  
- Lower quality that Tier 
One 
- Educate a wider selection of 
Chinese people and help China 
transform itself from an 
investment-driven economy to a 
talent-driven economy  
- Train a next generation of 
talented workers in fields of 
education, political science, law, 
medicine and health, publicity 
and cultural information, disaster 
prevention, equipment 
manufacturing, information 
technology, biotechnology, new 
materials, aeronautics and 
astronautics, oceanography, 
finance and accounting, 
international business, 
environmental protection, energy 
resources, agricultural 
technology, and modern traffic 
and transportation  
Tier Three,  
三本大学 
- Generally private 
institutions, accredited 
by the Ministry of 
Education 
-  Tend to be technical 
schools  
- Train Chinese youth in skills 
needed to navigate the job market 
 
 
  
                                            
97 Thanks to Wang Tingying for her help thinking through these distinctions. 
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- Generally low quality, 
along the lines of teach 
shops  
 
  
 
 
4.2: Quality Control   
 
  
 The result of these policies is that the Chinese higher education system is highly 
stratified and plays into the intense economic and political inequality of China’s political 
scene. From uncertain beginnings thirty years ago, Chinese top tier universities have 
made great strides towards quality improvement in recent years.   As of 2008, no 
Chinese university had yet made the top 200 in the world according to the Shanghai 
Jiaotong University (STJU) Ranking. In 2004, only two Chinese universities were among 
the top 300, although that number did increase to five by 2008. According to the Times 
rankings, five Chinese universities were among the top 200 in 2004 and that figure rose 
to six by 2008, while most of those schools jumped dramatically in rank over that time. 
Clearly, the rate of progress towards achieving the national goal laid out in the 985 
Project of developing world-class universities in China, but the system still has a long 
way to go before reaching its goals.  
 The success of these few schools, however, stands in stark contrast to the larger 
system, which suffers from hyperactive growth. From 1978 to 2006, the number of 
higher education institutions in China more than tripled, and total enrollment exploded 
by a factor of twenty. Government policies for expanding higher education accelerated in 
enrollments beginning around 1999 such that, from 1999 to 2006, new enrollments grew 
at the astonishing average rate of 23 percent a year. As a result, the average annual 
increase in faculty has not kept pace. In just one year from before the start of drastic 
expansion in 1998 to 1999, the average student-faculty ratio rose from 8.8 to 10.3. Since 
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then, the ratio has continued to rise to 16.2 in 2003 and 17.2 in 2006.98  When, in 2009, 
the OECD conducted a review of Chinese higher education, it “found tertiary education 
in a transitional stage” where “after a period of rapid expansion, China has entered a 
period of stabilization in an effort to address concerns about quality, equality, and 
apparent imbalances between graduate supply and labor market demand.”99   Curiously, 
the pledge to push new leaps of expansion under the 2010 Talent Plan came the 
following year Despite their many quality challenges, Chinese universities are fated to 
continue to expand and carry the weight of China’s future growth.100 While, in the 
stratified system, top tier schools are provided the resources necessary to invest in 
intellectual improvements, the vast majority of schools within the second tier are 
strained for resources and suffer poor quality. Other obvious quality issues across the 
Chinese system, including even the most elite institutions, are i) taboo areas of study 
dotted across the intellectual landscape, and ii) carry-over effects of a larger educational 
style that, since elementary school, emphasizes rote memorization to the exclusion of 
creativity or critical thought.101 While these challenges are being met with relative 
success within the top tier of schools, the vast bulk of higher education institutions face 
severe quality challenges.  
 
 
4.3: The Top Tier, Yiben Daxue  
 
                                            
98 Haizheng Li, 276, 273.  
99 OECD Reviews of Tertiary Education: China, by Michael Gallagher, Abrahar 
Hasan, Mary Canning, Howard Newby, Lichia Saner-Yiu and Ian Whitman, 
2009, p. 7. 
100 For commentary on the dismal state of higher education quality, see 
Kristof, Nicholas, “China’s Winning Schools?” The New York Times, January 
15, 2011; “Teaching Case Studies in China: The Western Dean of a Business 
School in Shanghai” The Economist, January 20, 2011.   
101 Chua.  
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 The inequality of China’s tiered system means that, generally, only the most elite 
top tier universities envisioned by the 985 Project are involved consulted by top-level 
decision-makers in the government. Of the 1,867 higher education institutions that 
existed in China as of 2006, this tier accounts for roughly 0.02 percent of the total 
system. Yet these few schools are highly influential among the few Chinese who hold de 
jure political power.102 Thus, while the greatest unintended effects of higher education 
expansion are likely to stem from the goings on in second tier schools, or erben daxue, 
which account for the vast majority of enrollments and house the aspiring middle class, 
these developments will be the subject of another study.  While the expansion of erben 
daxue is likely to create huge pressure on the Chinese political system as the rising 
expectations of young people outpace labor market realities, this analysis is more 
interested in how, or if, yiben daxue, or top tier schools, may shape elite preferences for 
meeting those challenges if and when the need arises.103  
 To this end, a particularly interesting feature of these elite universities is the 
relative freedom of speech and inquiry allowed within them.104 This freedom seems to 
exist for two reasons. First, in the international context of higher education standards, 
no Chinese university could compete without relaxing restrictions on freedom of thought 
and inquiry. Second, the rising complexity of governance in the twentieth-century 
creates a rising premium on accurate knowledge for the Party. To meet these challenges 
                                            
102 Li Haizheng; Because these schools are also responsible for creating the 
knowledge that will then theoretically be disseminated through the rest of the 
higher education system, they may have some influence over ideational flows 
throughout the system as well.  
103 Kapur, 2008.   
104 There is a distinction in Chinese law between freedom of speech and 
freedom of action. While the views on democracy advocated by Liu Xiaobo, 
who won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2010 were fairly radical, they were not the 
reason for his imprisonment. His transgression was in writing and circulating 
Charter 08, a petition demanding faster political reforms towards elections 
and multi-party democracy.    
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scholars within top tier universities are selected to target world-class status are allowed 
widening freedom to question and debate without much fear of sanction, unless they 
become too zealous in advocating regime change. While not supposed to challenge single 
party rule, they actively examine policies with a critical eye and offer suggestions on how 
specific policies might be reformed and improved.105  
 
 
4.4: The Chinese Information System in Theory  
 
 Clearly, there is tension in Chinese policy making between wanting to transform 
China into a modern, creative society and wanting to maintain control over that society. 
106 Towards the first goal, free flows of information and discussion are necessary; 
towards the second, control over information is paramount.107  To protect legitimacy 
through performance, the CCP reaches out to top scholars for help in developing 
policies.108 For practical reasons of allowing clear-thinking scholarship and political 
reasons of seeking to develop world-class institutions of learning, it has allowed 
                                            
105 Fogel, Robert. “Why China’s Economy Will Grow to $123 Trillion by 2040.” 
Foreign Policy. January/February 2010. Accessed November 20, 2010.   
106 To this end, the CCP is constantly trying to save face, or mianzi (面子), 
and cannot admit flaws or limitations to its ability. In short, the one party 
system has created a standard of perfection that the party must at least 
pretend to meet.  
107 Senor, Dan, and Saul, Singer, Start-up Nation: the Story of Israel’s 
Economic Miracle (New York: Twelve, 2009); Johnson, Seven, Where 
Good Ideas Come From: the Natural History of Innovation (New York: 
Riverhead, 2010).   
108 According to Brookings Research Fellow, Lili Wang, “Chinese scholars are 
regularly asked to give lectures to top level leaders. Through this special 
channel scholars are able to communicate with decision-makers face-to-face.” 
The Brookings Institution, “Think Tanks in China: Growing Influence and 
Political Limitations,” Oct. 23, 2008; Also see Fogel, Robert “$123,000,000,000, 
000: China’s Estimated Economy by the Year 2040. Be Warned.” Foreign 
Policy, Jan/Feb, 2010.   
 46 
development of an elite sphere of academia in which ideas could be freely discussed. Of 
course, intellectuals are not meant to challenge one-party rule, nor are they meant to 
take their ideas outside the bounds of academia set up by the Party.109 Researchers, 
students and teachers who gained entry into these rare institutions are meant to discuss 
ideas freely amongst themselves, but only as intellectual exercise –if the Party wants 
advice, it will ask. 110  
 Figure Two, illustrated below, describes the idealized CCP vision for intellectual 
behavior. As the only agent with de jure power to shape policy outcomes, the CCP seeks 
to maintain single-party authoritarian power by developing stronger institutions of 
governance to buttress its own power and preempt any possible instability. To bridge 
information gaps, Party members selectively reach out to think tanks and scholars at 
elite universities for policy advice.111 While taking their inputs into consideration, the 
Party then formulates policies based on its own internal calculus (or, perhaps a form of 
intra-Party democratic structure) and dictates to the state media what information to 
relay to the larger Chinese public. Thus, information is intended to remain highly 
controlled within precise channels of communication.  
 
 
                                            
109 In a CNN interview on October 2, 2010, Fareed Zakaria asked Wen Jiabao, 
“Can China be a strong and creative nation with so many restrictions on 
freedom of expression and the Internet being censored?” Wen replied that 
people should have freedom of speech “within the range allowed by the 
constitution and the laws.” 
110 Intellectuals were not meant to take political initiatives or turn ideas 
into action. Failure to abide by these rules would have serious 
consequences, along the lines of Liu Xiaobo’s experience. Liu Xiaobo, the 
Nobel Peace Prize-winning political dissident, was a professor at Beijing 
Normal University.   
111 While American think tanks tend to use mass communication as an 
indirect way to influence decision makers, their Chinese counterparts use the 
media primarily to disseminate information from the government to the 
people. 
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 This theoretical structure, however, is not always followed in practice. Now home 
to 389 million Internet users, 747 million cellular phones and 314 million active main 
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line telephones, information in China is no longer easily controlled.112 As protesters 
increasingly use Internet or cellular phones to communicate and organize, the flow of 
information is much more difficult to control than such an idealized flow would require. 
In short, the system illustrated in Figure Two is completely impracticable in the modern 
era. Elites within top tier universities and think tanks constantly publish articles for 
mass consumption, bloggers compete with state media as news providers and, what is 
more, none of the imagined distinctions between civil society and those in think tanks or 
at universities are as finite in reality as they are in Figure Two.  The same individuals 
who attend elite universities in China or abroad, or work in think tanks, are also 
members of civil society. People communicate, and ideas spread. Considering that China 
hopes to have 195 million college graduates by 2020, the official intention to maintain 
control over the information system is unrealistic.  
 By expanding higher education on such a massive scale, the CCP is creating an 
entire new force of people who, while not necessarily political activists themselves, are 
likely to be better educated, more informed, and more receptive to new intellectual ideas. 
While intellectual quality differs widely across the system, the sense of empowerment 
gained by having a degree is certain to affect aspirations across society. CCP’s 
overreactions to minute public protests in recent weeks during the spring of 2011 suggest 
its acute awareness that political mobilization does not require everyone involved to be 
an activist or leader. Once enough latent will becomes strong enough, mass movements 
can snowball from only a small instigating force and few leaders.113   
 The complexity of higher education in China is that it forms part of a dynamic 
process of reform and readjust. The CCP decision-makers are simultaneously acting and 
being acted upon by the system they govern and, as such, outcomes are likely to be 
                                            
112 The CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/ch.html. 
113 Seabrook, John, “Crush Point” The New Yorker, February 7, 2011. 
 49 
dynamic and complex as the system matures. While the CCP has one set of intended 
outcomes, unanticipated consequences are also likely.  
 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE:  
Intended Outcomes 
 
 
 
 
 
 While noting the obvious goal of higher education to further China’s economic 
development and solidify its status as a super power, this chapter focuses on the 
intention of the CCP to use higher education to strengthen itself. To bolster their own 
authority against a backdrop of complex challenges and a changing landscape, Party 
leaders at the apex of China’s political system increasingly look to scholars in elite 
universities and think tanks to inform and shape policy proposals. By focusing on one 
small subset of liberalized higher education in top tier schools it is possible to consider 
how social scientists are increasingly influencing reforms within Chinese decision-
making. The current chapter will describe recent efforts by the center to utilize 
developments within higher education to push reforms within its own institutional 
structure, at all levels of the politically apparatus.  
 
 5.1: Strengthening Institutions Governance  
  
 In recent years, institutional reform has become a central priority for Beijing as 
labor uprisings become more widespread and reports of corruption at the local level 
abound. Yet reforming such a complex, decentralized Party apparatus is not 
straightforward. In the Chinese political system, failures in governance have severe 
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consequences for legitimacy since, in Chinese politics, only certain elites have power to 
choose. The middle class may have some power to pressure them, and the majority is 
paternalistically ‘looked after.’ 114  
 While the CCP seeks social harmony, politics in complex societies are inherently 
conflictual.115  To manage these conflicting interests with some semblance of justice and 
respect for human agency (and therefore minimizes the likelihood of uprisings), Western 
institutions were designed to balance competing goals of freedom and fairness.116 Given 
that the current norms of Western institutional design developed over a long political 
trajectory, the introduction suggested they are a kind of political technology, or an 
application of knowledge for practical purpose. From Aristotle to Rawls, Westerns have 
come to believe that good laws govern citizen behavior and should have some moralizing 
effect. “Justice,” we say, “is the first virtue of social institutions.”117  
 When institutions of governance are in their infancy, they must be carefully 
nurtured in order to gain strength. Institutional development depends on strong human 
restraint in leadership to curtail de facto personal power, in favor of allowing the de jure 
                                            
114 While no society is completely just, nor any government perfectly moral, 
China’s system can seem less committed to principles of freedom or fairness 
than others.114 Yet even in the best-designed institutional settings, fairness of 
political outcome is no guarantee; freedoms are limited. Rawls worried that, 
even within a social contract where people come together to choose the basic 
principles to govern their society, collectively decided choices may not always 
be fair. Some players might be naturally stronger, wealthier, or savvier than 
others. Some may take advantage of a superior bargaining position. Especially 
in less developed states, there is often a discontinuity between 
constitutionally codified, or de jure political freedoms, and their de facto 
practical realities. 
115 Acemoglu and Robinson.   
116 See, Sandel, Michael J. Justice: A Reader (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007).   
117 Rawls, John, “The Role of Justice” in A Theory of Justice (1971), cited in 
Sandel, p. 203; Aristotle argued the laws are part of the education of a good 
man through good citizenship.  
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power of institutions to determine outcomes. 118 In the Chinese context, however, this has 
not yet happened. Terrified by the prospect of losing social stability, Chinese leaders tend 
to sweep aside emerging institutions of governance whenever they fear these may break 
under pressure. As a result, national institutions of government, such as the rule of law, 
are repeatedly undermined. Each time this happens, the process of institution building 
suffers.  
 Based on current policy initiatives laid out by the 17th Central Committee of the 
CCP for internal institutional reform and the high level leadership’s frequent 
consultation with intellectuals from think tanks or elite universities, it appears Beijing 
desires to develop better political institutions of governance, likely to bolster its own 
power. If this process ever truly begins in earnest, however, it is likely to occur over a 
gradual period of time, for three reasons. First, as institutions develop, their power 
becomes ‘institutionalized’ as norms are reinforced.119 Thus, over time, successful 
institutionalization makes it more natural for leadership to defer to institutions of 
governance and work within the bounds of power they allocate, instead of trying to 
override those limitations at every turn based on whatever de facto personal power he or 
she may have.  The second reason requires the helpful conceptualization of institutions 
of governance as a sort of political technology. While this technology has been worked 
out and reinforced throughout the history of government in the West, this narrative has 
shown it is a surprisingly recent import to the Chinese state. Individual leaders need 
                                            
118 Versus the “highly coercive society” in which “even party officials held 
their tongues for fear of purge or punishment,” the current political system 
“sets high educational requirements for officials, and there is enormous 
debate over policies both inside and outside their governing institutions.” 
Lieberthal, 124; Robert Fogel, a University of Chicago economist who often 
advises the CCP on economic questions, believes this process of consideration 
is the “reason Beijing has avoided repeats of the Great Leap Forward in recent 
years.” Fogel, 4 
119 See Kapur, and Thelen.   
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time to learn the intricacies of the institutional process.120  Third and perhaps most 
important to this analysis, there is a relationship between the sophistication of ideas 
regarding institutional reforms and designs in the Chinese political system and the 
higher education system through which institutional technologies are passed. The quality 
of higher education matters as a factor in this process. To develop a political system 
based on strong institutions, willful leaders, well educated in the intricacies of 
institutionalized government who are both capable of critical thought and bold enough to 
voice their opinions, are needed at all levels of governance.121 The current relative 
ineptitude of the Chinese education system generally to foster critical political 
questioning probably doesn’t help the process of institutional change and development 
within the CCP.122  
 Through higher education, the Party has tried to restructure and improve itself 
across all levels of governance through i) changes in the Party composition towards more 
educated, independent leadership and ii) better information on which to base public 
                                            
120 Kapur, Lieberthal, 167. Lieberthal has written that, as late as the late 
1990s, most CCP leaders “have not had sustained exposure…to Western 
democratic values, as opposed to Western standards of production and 
consumption.”  
121 During the 1989 Tiananmen Crisis, Deng Xiaoping and his older comrades 
(who had nominally retired and handed power over to a new generation of 
leaders), failed to obey the de jure power structure in place and instead 
resumed authority under the de jure power they retained. Under stress, 
institutions broke down and Deng and the other party elders simply overruled 
de jure power structures with their de facto personal authority. From April to 
June 1989, no normal structures of leadership authority pertained. Strikingly, 
the formal leaders of the party and government either did not convene or met 
only to hear and approve the decisions made by Deng and/or his elderly 
colleagues. While “almost all political systems strain institutional boundaries 
at times of crisis,” the Chinese “during these crucial weeks effectively set 
aside their institutional structure and revealed to all the locus of real power 
at the top –the semi-‘retired’ octogenarians –ten years after the reforms 
began.” Deng, like Mao, also frequently damaged the institutional 
arrangements he himself had created. See, Lieberthal, 153.  
122 Remember the poor quality of higher education in China. See Kristof, 
Nicholas. “China’s Winning Schools?” The New York Times, January 15, 2011.   
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policy. In some sense, these are interrelated. Both of these policies relied on supposed 
gains from higher education to create a class of leaders better able to govern effectively 
and protect the center’s power.  
 
 
5.2: Think Tanks and Intellectual Freedoms  
 
 As the academic or research centers most often tapped to help CCP decision-
making, think tanks provide a helpful lens into the increasing norms for involving careful 
intellectual inquiry in policy making. As knowledge becomes more valued and taboo 
topics are scaled back, even think tanks may ultimately create unintended consequences 
for the regime. Since Hu Jintao became Secretary General of the CCP think tank 
members have been regularly invited to give lectures to the politburo Study Sessions. 
Recently, the trends have accelerated.  “Currently, Chinese scholars are regularly asked 
to give lectures to top level leaders. Through this special channel, scholars are able to 
communicate with decision-makers face to face,” and make their voices heard in highly 
influential circles. 
 Think tanks members enjoy a strong personal network and work through 
interpersonal relationships and internal channels to exert influence.123 Now that China’s 
market economy has made the Chinese economic and sociopolitical structure more 
pluralistic, it has also created many interest groups. These groups, especially those in the 
business sector, have subsequently become actively engaged in trying to influence 
government policy and public opinion. Against this backdrop the need for accurate 
                                            
123 McGann believes “Chinese government think tanks may overshadow 
American independent think tanks in terms of influence.” 
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information, and hence for reliable advice from think tanks staffed by critically and free 
thinking intellectuals, has only grown.124   
 Within the university itself, university-based think tanks provide a direct 
pathway of communication between scholars and high-level CCP leaders. In the 1990s, 
Hu turned the Central Party School into one of the most promising think tanks of the 
1990s, when he served as the president of the school. Sun Qingjiu, then vice president of 
the Central Party School, played a crucial role in the development of Hu Jintao’s theory, 
the so-called “peaceful rise” or “peaceful development” of China.125  Since, the Chinese 
authorities announced a list of the top ten government run think tanks in 2006, their 
roles have been further enhanced. Now meanwhile, some other think tanks – and 
especially those in the universities or in the private sector – have attempted to exert 
influence on China’s decision-making process by offering a more critical view of 
government actions largely through the Chinese media.” Think tanks and universities 
alike have played important roles in advocating for policy changes in the past.126 In 
elevating the status of these elite centers of thought, however, the CCP is also 
empowering a new group of actors who may ultimately behave in unintended ways. 
Because they constitute a crucial link between the academic and policy-making spheres, 
                                            
124 Many of these, like the Chinese People’s Public Security University, based 
in the Muxidi Nanli section of Beijing, and the Number Four Public Security 
Research Institution fall directly within the purview of Government 
Ministries. These influential institutions report directly to the Ministry of 
Public Security, China’s Police Ministry, and are concerned specifically with 
maintaining social stability.124 While they are unambiguously co-opted by 
party interests, Tanner, who has closely examined these two institutions, 
finds that one of their important functions has been to “take the lid off of 
[previously taboo subjects] and begin to focus –and begin to carry out research 
on…once-taboo issues” such as drug use in China.”124 These institutions have 
played an important role pushing boundaries. 
125 Brookings, “Think Tanks in China,” 6. 
126 For example, the Party recently adjusted the policy on ¼ votes in the 
countryside.  
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however, these institutions will later be used as a proxy to evaluate the types of elite 
ideational changes higher education expansion may be unintentionally creating in the 
Chinese state. 127 
 
5.3: i) Promoting Norms of Institutional Governance at the Individual Level 
 
 Since the CCP is a political structure governed more by interpersonal 
relationships and norms of behavior than rule of law, the first dimension of institutional 
change within the CCP involved cycling out old lower level cadres in favor of new. As 
studies of leadership changes during the 1980s reveal, “the degree of turnover was large 
and that the changes reached down to every level of the administrative system.”128 
Heberer and Schubert describe Deng’s strategy of “political structural reform,” or 
zhengzhi tizhi gaige (政治体制改革) a strategy of “institutionalized personalism.” By this 
they mean “a non-articulated consensus within the Communist leadership that informal 
                                            
127 While think tanks, or zhiku (智库) or sixiangku (思想库) are not new in 
China, and arguably have played an important role in Chinese politics as early 
as the time of Confucius, they have only recently regained prominence in 
modern China. During the past two decades, and especially in recent years, 
their role has expanded rapidly. Since, in many ways, the Chinese think tank 
embodies the political purpose of academia within the Chinese state, these 
trends can be said to reflect the wider trends in higher education discussed in 
this paper. China currently is home to approximately 1,000 think tanks. Of 
this number, most are government think tanks. Independent think tanks 
constitute only about five percent of the total, and these are usually small 
scale with twenty employees at most. Like the university, where the 
researchers who staff think tanks were educated, these think tanks are 
becoming internationally integrated as “increasingly governments are finding 
that they must scan globally in order to find policy solutions to deal with 
rapidly breaking problems.” 
128 Lieberthal 159 
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personalism should gradually be replaced by structures and, eventually, by 
‘constitutional sanctification.’”129  
 While local people may not need to be educated in the practices of democracy 
before elections can be instituted, it does seem that leaders do. Despite the fact that 
political changes within the structure of CCP governance are often “discredited as pure 
window-dressing targeted at the perpetuation of authoritarian one-party rule” or 
“conceived of as half-hearted or futile efforts on the part of an ailing regime to maintain 
stability or legitimacy” this study will discuss how these changes may truly have shaped 
the Chinese political landscape.130 China may not have moved from a rigidly single-party 
state to a liberal multi-party democracy, or even in that direction, the past thirty years of 
restructuring may have laid a new groundwork.  
 The CCP is a huge institution with malleable procedures such that de facto power 
seems to override de jure power in many cases. The result is individuals make a bigger 
difference.131 Political realities are negotiated from institutional guidelines, interpersonal 
relationships and individual incentives. 132 Meaningful change should theoretically 
require either drastic change in one of those three variables, or gradual change in all of 
them. Institutions change slowly. While each new input will have a certain effect, 
especially at the weak phase of institutional formation, these are not always predictable 
in a linear sense.133  
                                            
129 Herberer and Schubert, 15; While they offer up the increasingly ritualized 
nature of succession politics at the top tier of the Party as evidence of this 
subtle consensus, there a notable time lag between the initiation of these 
politics for structural transformation within the Party and their reflection in 
practice. 
130 Herberer and Schubert, 12.  
131 Acemoglu and Robinson.  
132 Lieberthal, 186.  
133 Thelen.  
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 Since the 1980s, a major turnover of elites brought in younger, better-educated 
officials throughout the system. Finally, individuals who had joined the revolution before 
1949 were replaced by younger people with rising education levels. Now a college 
education is almost always required for advancement to the highest levels of the political 
and economic system, and even those who were already in power before college 
education became the norm for advancing in the CCP increasingly return to university to 
prove their reliability through accreditation.134 Thus, by the late 1980s or early 1990s, 
“those who now staff the CCP and government did not personally participate in the 
revolution.”135  
 Thus, over the past thirty years, the Party has begun to develop more modern 
political institutions through tinkering at the institutional and political levels, which, in 
the Chinese system, are intertwined. Leaders at the center work with intellectuals to 
design public policies that may constrain local-level officials to toe the line of good 
governance and curtail corruption. These effects are not linear and are often 
unpredictable and sporadic, reflecting the continued weakness of structures in place. 
Because the leadership mistrusts its own institutional structures, it often sweeps them 
aside in moments of pressure. Each time de jure organization is undermined by de facto 
power, however, de jure power is undermined and institutions are weakened further. 
While official policies seem to trend towards “establishing responsive political 
institutions, feedback channels of communication between the state and its citizens and 
inclusive models of participation,” true change will not come until leaders at every level 
of the system curtail their own personal de facto power long enough to reinforce de jure 
institutional power. 136  
 
                                            
134 Shambaugh.  
135 Lieberthal, 158. 
136 Heberer and Schubert, 11.  
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5.4: ii) Vision for Institutional Innovation   
 
 Since the early 1990s, the CCP leadership seems to have developed a model of 
political survival based on carefully gathering information about the political realities in 
the Chinese state and then scrambling to preempt and adapt before they become 
overwhelming. 137 These have “triggered a range of intraparty reforms as well as reforms 
affecting other sectors of the state, society and economy.” Thus, “while reacting to the 
events in former communist party-states, the CCP has been very proactive in instituting 
reforms within itself and within China.”  
 As a result, the Chinese political system is no longer exclusively top down. 
Decision-makers at the apex increasingly recognize the limits to their own knowledge of 
local level realities and engage with local reforms through a dynamic process of back-
and-forth. Herberer and Schubert have identified a two-way percolation model by which 
political changes are made within the Chinese system. The Chinese, they say, have come 
to understand political reform as “the legalization of successful local practice.” This can 
happen in two ways: either the center dreams up a policy change and selects certain 
localities in which it will be tried out or evaluated, or local governments experiment with 
political reforms on their own and news spreads upwards. If policies are successful they 
will be expanded to other localities; if not, they will be disbanded and hushed up. 
                                            
137 When whispers of the Jasmine Revolution started online in spring 2011 
after the wave of regime change in the Middle East, the CCP recalled the 
lessons from the USSR again. Following the 1989 crisis in Tiananmen Square 
and the subsequent collapse of communist ruling parties in the Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe, the CCP systematically began to evaluate the causes of 
collapse of these other ruling parties in addition to analyzing any possible 
internal and external challenges to itself. Chinese leaders were determined to 
know what lessons to take from the implosion and demise of these other 
regimes that might help it avoid a similar fate. 
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Throughout the process, Chinese academics in universities and think tanks monitor the 
program closely and make recommendations regarding is propensity for success in other 
places. Slowly, more sophisticated, better-educated local leadership allowed new models 
for institutional design and policy reforms to be tried out on local levels. Herberer and 
Schubert have described a “percolation model” whereby “the central government 
introduces a reform measure on an experimental basis in certain selected localities or on 
a voluntary basis for any locality that wants to implement the corresponding measure, 
before fully institutionalizing it at the national level.” 
 Increasingly, policies are developed over a long process of deliberation and local 
level experimentation. Restructuring of Party membership cycled out old membership 
and interests to allow such a process to be set in motion. The 1987 experimental Organic 
Law on Villager Communities provides a good example of this. After “observing and 
assessing the implementation process for over a decade, a revised Organic Law was 
finally promulgated in 1998, making direct village elections legally binding for the whole 
country.”138 Other examples include, the “institutionalization of the Household 
Responsibility System in the early 1980s, which contracted agricultural production to 
private households and led to the development of large produce markets and township 
village enterprises later on. In other cases, local level leaders envision their own reforms 
and try them out on a local level. If the reforms are successful, other local leaders and 
possibly the center will take note and the experiment will be replicated in other localities. 
If not, they are desisted and the Party pretends the failed experiment never happened. 
The incorporation of villager self-government into the new 1982 state constitution 
followed a controversial debate in the Communist leadership on the implications of a 
couple of non-authorized experiments already underway in two counties in Guanxi 
province shortly after the breakdown of the People’s Commune System. Other examples 
                                            
138 Heberer and Schubert, 16. 
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are measures like those adopted in Hainan concerning administrative restructuring and 
the introduction of new, economically self-responsible government units (“small 
government, big society”) or more recent experiments with new procedures to select 
local government cadres in Chinese townships, although these have not been legalized at 
the national level yet.”139 On a national level, cycling in new, better-educated local 
leaders throughout the Party has allowed Beijing to adopt a more rational process of 
governing. In just thirty years, it seems higher education has played a role in helping to 
replace doublethink with practical evaluations of outcomes, academic think and think 
tanks to inform policies.  
 
 
 
 
5.5: Intra-Party Democracy?  
 
 By tapping elite scholars within the university to inform public policy towards 
strengthening the Party’s hold on power and ability to maintain stability, CCP elites have 
eventually caught on to the idea of importing certain institutional designs created in the 
West to mediate competing groups and smoothly resolve conflict without disrupting 
stability. Scholars in the West have observed that, in seeking to develop “intra-Party 
democracy” as a system of checks and balances into its own Party structure, CCP leaders 
are striving to bolster, rather than to undermine, one-party rule. As the Party has 
transformed over the past three decades, from a monolithic apparatus led by a single 
strong leader (first Mao, then Deng), to “a diverse system of collective leadership in 
which rival factions compete for power, influence and political sway,” it has grown a 
need to build internal structures into its own apparatus in order to manage conflicting 
                                            
139 Heberer and Schubert, 16.  
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interests fluidly while maintaining a façade of total unity. 140 Whether these changes will 
serve to bolster or undermine Party power remains to be seen.  
 While the party appears to be trying to harness higher education to develop well-
designed institutions of governance able to mediate social conflict and bolster Party 
legitimacy, the current institutions that characterize the Party’s apparatus are weak. 
While Beijing can easily exert its power to crack down in terms of crisis, this negative 
power to suppress does not translate to positive power of governance across the country. 
Building up institutions is much more difficult, and outside their capability.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.6: Experiments in Deliberative Democracy  
 
 
“No matter how smart we are, we officials have limited information…the easiest way to 
avoid mistakes is by having more democratic decisions.”  
-Jian Zhaohua, Communist Party Secretary of Zeguo Township, Zhejiang Province, 
China 
 
 Promoting grass-roots level democracy is another dimension of attempted 
institutional adjustments directed by the center as it attempts to protect Party 
legitimacy. Far from a unified political unit, the CCP is actually a highly hierarchical 
apparatus of 70 million people. Often the relationship between the center and local level 
leadership is not one of teamwork but of competing interests. While it may be in the 
interest of local level leaders to behave as petty dictators, collecting rents unjustly from 
                                            
140 Li, Cheng, “Intra-Party Democracy in China: Should We Take It Seriously?” 
China Leadership Monitor, The Brookings Institute.  
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those they govern, it is in Beijing’s interest to weed out such behavior from the 
countryside to prevent rural uprisings that could threaten legitimacy.  
 To develop a Chinese style democracy, political scientists in top tier universities 
are scanning the globe for new models; with interesting results deeply connected to the 
ideational mechanisms described herein. And yet, these efforts have remained generally 
unsuccessful. Pan Wei of Beijing University is one of many Chinese intellectuals skeptical 
of the practical utility of elections in China. In reference to certain experiments with 
grassroots democracy being tried out in various rural localities, such as those in Sechuan 
Province, Pan feels the “experiment will go nowhere.” In his view, these select 
experiments, pushed for by the center, have only been tried in certain places because 
“the local leaders have their personal political goal: they want to make their names 
known. But the experiment has not succeeded. In fact, Sichuan is the place with the 
highest number of mass protests. Very few other places want to emulate it.”141   
 
CHAPTER SIX:  
Theory vs Reality – A Tale of Unintended Consequences 
 
 
  
 By seizing higher education as a mode of national development, the CCP quickly 
allowed an entrenched special interest to spring up, and gain a momentum of its own.142 
Chinese upper classes now engage with the international economy on a much deeper 
level. They are exposed not only to alternate value systems, but also to Western 
institutional technologies designed to manage political conflict through deliberation and 
                                            
141 Leonard, Mark, “China’s New Intelligentsia,” Prospect, Issue 144, March 
28, 2008. 
142 And that’s without taking social media and communications technologies 
into account.  
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representation –as opposed to constantly trying to preempt uprisings of political protest. 
These are trends that, while likely to have powerful social repercussions within the 
Chinese state, have passed beyond the control of the Party. At this point, it is unlikely 
Beijing could stop the forces if it wanted to.  
 
6.1: The Knowledge Economy  
 
 
“first-rate research and advanced education are essential ingredients of success in 
today’s global economy” 
 
-Derek Bok, ex-president of Harvard143  
 
 
 Nowadays, no study of Chinese decision-making is complete without 
understanding the role of economic growth and development. In the case of higher 
education, the economy has been a central driver. This is in large part because of the role 
of the economy that China’s recent higher education drive is likely to have unintended 
consequences. This is because education reforms increasingly operate based on a logic of 
their own, independent the Party’s control.  
 Over the past two decades, evolving technologies have tied highest value in the 
world economy to the innovative, creative and knowledge-based levels of production. 144  
                                            
143 Bok, Underachieving Colleges, 5.  
144 Linden, Gred, Kenneth L. Kraemer, and Jasen Dedrick, “Who Captures 
Value in a Global Innovation System? The case of Apple’s iPod,” Personal 
Computing Industry Center (PCIC), University of California, Irvine, 2007; In 
2007, Linden, Kraemer and Dedrick of the University of California, Irvine 
published a study titled, “Who Captures Value in a Global Innovation System? 
The Case of Apple’s iPod.” The project built a framework for understanding 
how value is distributed across the complex international supply chains 
involved in producing globally innovative products, like the Apple iPod.  Since 
innovation is held to be the key to national competitiveness in the new global economy, 
the authors wanted to understand who captures the value from a successful innovation. 
Their findings supported the prevailing wisdom of our time. Innovation 
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Now that supply chains mean manufacturing will be easily relocated to whichever 
country returns the biggest profits, and communication technologies have made even 
services outsource-able, the knowledge and innovation dimensions of human capital 
have become key limiting factors to economic growth.145 This creates a rapidly rising 
premium on higher education for individuals, firms and nations alike.146 As the demands 
of the new international ‘Knowledge Economy’ continue to grow, universities have come 
to play a key role training a national labor supply.147 To rise up the international value 
chain, China has determined to enter the “next phase of its economic development” and 
has begun to “invest in human capital with the same determination it used to build 
highways.”148 
 For the individual as well as national economies, there is a rising premium placed 
                                                                                                                                  
breeds competitiveness. Value in our global economy is linked to knowledge, 
creativity and innovation. 
145 Changes in communication technologies have changed not only the 
organization of our economy, but the very way we interact politically in 
society. For an interesting debate on the role of social media in public 
protests, see Shirky, Clay and Malcolm Gladwell, “From Innovation to 
Revolution: Do Social Media Make Protests Possible?” Foreign Affairs, 
March/April 2011, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67325/malcolm-
gladwell-and-clay-shirky/from-innovation-to-revolution.   
146 Today, “more than half of all young people in America go to college, and more than a 
quarter receive a bachelor’s degree. Virtually every aspiring lawyer, doctor, minister, 
scientists, and schoolteacher must earn a college diploma, and almost all future corporate 
executives, legislators, and high public officials will do the same.” This is a new 
phenomenon, however. The university as we know it did not come into being until 
recently. “As late as 1940, fewer than 1 in 20 adults had a B.A. degree. It is only within 
the past 50 years that universities have come to boast the huge enrollments, the 
elaborately equipped research laboratories, and the legions of faculty members and other 
instructors that fill their campuses today.” Bok, 4, 11.  
147 Bok; Fogel estimated the effects of well-trained workers in an economy and found 
that, in the US, a high school-educated worker is 1.8 times as productive as someone with 
a 9th grade education, and a college graduate is three times as productive. In the case of 
China, Fogel believes that “the increase in high-skilled workers will substantially boost 
the country’s annual growth rate for a generation, taking its GDP to an eye-popping $123 
trillion by 2040.” Thus, education will play a large role building China into the world’s 
largest economy by 2040; Zakaria, 54.  
148 Zakaria, Fareed, “The New Challenge from China,” Time, October 18, 2010  
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on innovation, creativity and transferable skills in a national labor force.149 As the CCP 
continues to navigate through uncharted political and economic territory, policy has 
been continually driven forward, not by deliberate planning, but by a take-it-as-we-go 
process of reform and readjust. 
 
6.2: Cycles of Reform and Readjust  
 
 In light of the CCP’s approach to policy reform suggested by Shambaugh’s model 
of atrophy and adaptation, it appears that the current momentum of educational change 
in the PRC could push new reforms to the Chinese political system. This is because, 
consequence of rapid economic growth, old public policies become quickly outdated. 
Since the Chinese government is paternalistic and not well representative, it does not 
adapt naturally to public opinion as democracies theoretically do through electoral 
pressures. Instead it struggles to keep up through “a constant cycle of reform-readjust-
reform-readjust.”150 Far from an agile monolith, however, the CCP is comprised of a 
diverse set of actors, each with his or her own special interests. While Beijing may want 
to weed out corruption to buttress its own legitimacy, the corrupt local level party 
leadership may prefer to maintain its own interests. The apparatus is not in-sync, and so 
                                            
149 President Obama, Second State of the Union(Text), The New York Times, 
January 25, 2011; Also see Surowiecki, James, “Sputnikonomics,” The New 
Yorker, February 14&21, 2011. In the 2010 National Bureau of Economic Research 
edited volume, American Universities in a Global Marketplace, Charles Clotfelter 
described a widespread rising sense of insecurity about America’s place in the changing 
international economy. “Not since the Soviet Sputnik, touched off a paroxysm of self-
doubt in the 1950s,” he wrote, has “alarm over the inadequacy of American research and 
training in science and technology reached such a crescendo.” From Thomas Friedman’s 
2005 book, The World is Flat, which “argued that the consequence of a shrinking 
American advantage in education could very well be the loss of American world 
leadership in high-tech industries” to the 2007 National Academy of Sciences 
publication, Rising Above the Gathering Storm, it seems a growing number of sources 
have “emphatically echoed the alarm.” 
150 Shambaugh. 
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the process of atrophy and adaptation described in Figure Three is, in reality, not a 
simplified linear cycle of unified action so much as a continually ongoing process, 
perpetually in motion.  
 The internal cycle set out in Figure Three describes how policy reforms have been 
driven forward, especially since the 1990s.  Economic goals or ambitions of the Party 
create the need for economic reforms that, by empowering new segments of society, 
create unintended consequences. As the de facto power of newly successful groups 
outpace their stagnant de jure status, the state atrophies. Insecure in its hold on 
legitimate power amidst political atrophy, the CCP responds with new policies of 
adaptation. Often these involve setting new economic goals, and the cycle begins again.  
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 This study suggests that higher education, because of its links to the new 
economy, may play into this cycle. China’s 2010 Talent Plan is designed to harness the 
power of higher education for national gain. As reforms play out and growing numbers of 
Chinese youth becomes educated, the CCP has to contend with their rising expectations 
–which complicate the demands of governance and raises the premium on good 
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performance.151 Internationalization of higher education creates ideational flows between 
Chinese elites and the democratic West so that the Party is soon held to international 
standards of governance and must again adapt to rising demands for broader access to 
education and political reforms.  
 Thus, as opposed to operating based on any long-term systematic vision for 
reform, the Party often takes a reactive, even defensive position. While, the Party has 
arguably invested in higher education based on a clear view for how Chinese intellectuals 
should behave, these expectations do not always conform to realities of human behavior. 
The winds of change are truly in motion in China and the Party, if begrudgingly, knows 
it.152 Information can no longer be easily controlled: the number of Internet users in 
China continues to soar, and a new generation of bloggers has emerged to fill in 
information left out by state-controlled old media.153  
 Modern Chinese politics is tug of war between “competing factions of Chinese 
leaders and public intellectuals with differing views.”154 To keep pace, the Party has, by 
necessity, come to include “more criticism and debate in the upper echelons of policy 
making than many realize.”  Thus, within the restricted sphere of elite knowledge flow, 
Chinese policymaking “has become much more responsive and open to new ideas than it 
was in the past.”155  
                                            
151 Since 1981, the rate of admission to college in China has risen from below 
10 percent to 48 percent in 1999 and 62 percent in 2004. Since 1999, more 
than half of those who took the entrance exam have been admitted into 
college. See Haizheng Li.  
152 See Li Cheng, “Intra-Party Democracy?” 
153 Charles, Arthur. “China’s Internet Users Surpass US Population.” The 
Guardian. 16 July 2009, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2009/jul/16/china-internet-more-users-
us-population; Many have gained such influence that in 2010, the John M. 
Huntsman, American Ambassador to China, invited a number of these young 
voices to the American embassy to discuss their views for the future. 
154 Li Cheng, “Intra-Party Democracy?” 
155 Fogel, 4, 5.   
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6.3: Higher Education and Foreign Influence   
 
 Those promoted to leadership in the new era tend to have strong education 
credentials and are committed to economic growth.156 Growth brings dramatic changes, 
however, and has brought negative effects particularly in the growing disparity between 
rich and poor. Three decades ago everyone was poor. Today, Chinese citizens can easily 
look over at their neighbors and see many more individuals relatively more successful 
than themselves. The visibility of disparity creates many added stresses and tensions 
that, in turn, contribute to new political challenges that must be dealt with.  
 To cope, the newly educated leadership are much more likely to seek out advice 
from others, in particular experts in the field, although not structurally required to. In 
that way, academics and intellectuals enjoy a certain influence through the knowledge 
they bring to the table.  This appears meaningful despite being poorly institutionalized. 
As will be discussed in more detail below, the key pathway through which this occurs is 
think tanks and, to a lesser extent, university-based research centers that CCP leaders 
tap for information to inform public policy itself provide a mechanism for unintended 
consequence to reforms underlying the system.  Thus current trends in the 
internationalization of higher education could provide ideational flows of unpredictable 
consequence for the Chinese state.   
  This is unpredictability draws on the fact that, suddenly exposed to powerful 
                                            
156The expansion of increasingly internationalized higher education is no 
minor development. Foreign knowledge can give shape to vague notions, 
previously unarticulated. Ideas can only be discussed when individuals have 
the language to articulate relevant thoughts. An individual can only think 
critically to question what he or she is told when she has enough information 
and knowledge to truly defend her point. The cliché ‘knowledge is power’ has 
as much truth in China as elsewhere.   
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ideational influence from the West, Chinese intellectuals and newly educated policy 
makers may be ideationally very different than CCP leaders anticipate. Again, the 
unintended consequence emerges from economic momentum. As part of its goal to 
emulate the creative and innovative impulses of American know-how, the CCP 
intentionally built its higher education system based on the American model.157  While 
Chinese have been studying abroad in the U.S. since the 1870s, when the first Chinese 
exchange students to the United States in search of ideational technologies that might 
help them strengthen the Qing dynasty, these intellectual exchanges have gained huge 
momentum in the past twenty years. As the U.S. is the most popular destination for 
Chinese students to study abroad, and Chinese correspondingly represent the largest 
group of foreign nationals to study in the U.S. every year. These trends are further 
reinforced by the rising number of American professors teaching in Chinese universities 
and the number of Chinese instructors trained in the U.S.  Chinese students study-
abroad with greater frequency and an increasing number of foreign faculty have come 
from the US to teach within the Chinese university. An illustration of these trends is 
offered in Figure Four below.  
 
                                            
157 Since the beginning of economic reforms starting in 1978, the Chinese 
government has implemented “major market reforms in higher education.” In 
addition to abandoning the job assigning system so that graduates could find 
jobs in the labor market, and charging tuition instead of having higher 
education be free, the CCP “opened higher education institutes to the outside 
world and encouraged collaborations and exchanges with universities 
worldwide.” As of 2006, 134,000 Chinese students traveled abroad to further 
their education; See Haizheng Li, 271, 269.  
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 Judging the fact that, as described in Figure Four, the proportion of self-funded 
students rose from 65 percent in 1999 to 90 percent by 2001, it appears that the students 
studying abroad tend to be members of the Chinese elite. While isolated from China’s 
majority, these elites interact closely with international elites through study-abroad at a 
rate that could have powerful consequences. The international integration Chinese 
intellectual elite is evolving fast. While students who studied abroad were historically 
seen with skepticism by the Chinese government, the CCP is now “starting to view higher 
education systems in developed countries as a part of the domestic higher education 
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system and is interested in partnering with U.S. and other research universities around 
the world in an effort to train its own research talent who will return to China.”158  
 Moreover, self-funded students have more flexibility to choose which subjects to 
study. In 1979, when 1,750 people were sent to study-abroad with national funding, 82.6 
percent studied natural science, 16.1 percent language, and only 1.3 percent social 
science. While the science-oriented pattern has arguably continued to the present day, 
the percentage of social science and law students is likely to have risen dramatically in 
recent years as the premium on international study for law, foreign language and 
business has increased with the international economic integration across all sectors.159. 
 Ironically, in accepting such strong influences of international education into 
elite centers of Chinese education, the Party is loosing its historic hold on the direction of 
thought being passed on within its national universities. While education in the earlier 
years of CCP governance was arguably designed as a force to promote nationalism, 
communist virtue and Maoist ideology, new top tier schools, based on the American 
model, may encourage a very different attitude towards government.160   
 
 
6.4: The Mistranslated Purposes of Higher Education 
 
 The Party seeks to rebuild elite national higher education with a blend of American 
ingenuity and the Confucian scholarly ideal of service to the ruler. While they try to 
mimic American higher education style for its successful emphasis on creativity and 
                                            
158 Haizheng Li, 286; Since 1999, the United States has received the largest number of 
Chinese study-abroad students, followed by Japan. In 2001, the U.K. surpassed Germany 
to become the largest hosting country for Chinese students after Japan. 
159 “Not Entirely Free, Your Honor” The Economist, July 29, 2010, 
internationalization of law, http://www.economist.com/node/16693882.  
160 Shirk.  
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innovation, however, they may be surprised to know most American educators see these 
as but side effects to the core purpose set out by elite American universities. Amy 
Gutmann at the University of Pennsylvania says the “primary purpose of higher 
education” is to “serve democracy as sanctuaries of non repression.”161 At Harvard 
University, ex-president Derek Bok similarly reflected that American universities bare a 
duty to prepare their pupils for responsible citizenship in society, and even, Bloom’s  
classic, The Closing of the American Mind, argued vehemently that “the education of a 
democratic man” forms the fundamental purpose of American higher education.162  
 It is unclear whether Chinese policy makers are aware of the irony involved in 
trying to bolster Party authority by investing 4 percent of GDP each year towards 
building an American-style education system to cultivate the creative and argumentative 
underpinnings of a democratic society. In an authoritarian system that keeps many 
skeletons hidden in its closets and, for generations, maintained tight controls on 
information flows, this could be potentially destabilizing. It is almost lucky for them 
quality remains so dismal.163  Yet, quality is not poor across the board. As will be further 
discussed in Chapter Seven, the winds of ideational change are beginning to set in 
motion.  
 
 
 
                                            
161 Gutmann, Amy, Democratic Education (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1987), 175,181, 185.  
162 Bok, Derek, Our Underachieving Colleges: a candid look at how much 
students learn and why they should be learning more (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2006); Bloom, Allan, The Closing of the American Mind 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987).  
163 For an interesting view into the frailty of academic integrity in the Chinese 
system, see “Chinese Ethics: Scientists Behaving Badly” The Economist, 
October 9th, 2010.  
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6.4: Retreat of Taboos   
 
 
 
 Around the late 1990s, Beijing directed an ideological shift in policy research. It 
became “widely and officially accepted by the leadership – to use the official Chinese 
ideology – that the vast majority of protests or mass incidents represented what they 
referred to as “contradictions among the people” as opposed to “contradictions between 
the people and the enemy.” In other words, beginning in the late 1990s, protests were 
“officially being seen primarily as people who basically had legitimate grievances,” as 
opposed to radical elements, or enemies to society. This ideological, or ideational shift 
that has since had dramatic consequences for the sorts of questions academics can ask. 
Since that time, new modes of research have emerged. Researchers concerned with social 
instability, for example, can now “say to others in the system legitimately look, this is not 
just an issue for coercion, we need to reform and respond to real grievances.”164 These 
changes build momentum for further changes within the system. The CCP political 
apparatus is no longer ideologically oriented and “leaders are increasingly problem 
solvers who give the impression of seeing economic development as the best way to 
handle the most important problems they face,” practical needs cause ideological shifts 
that affect the quality of academic research.165  
 At the Brookings Institute, a panel of experts on China’s emerging think tanks 
agreed they were likely to “gradually grow in quality, skill and influence.”  Tanner 
suggested that, “in the foreseeable future, Chinese government think tanks…will 
gradually become more independent and effective in terms of funding and research 
agenda and administration.” More than the current position now, the unintended 
                                            
164 Brookings, “Think Tanks in China,” 4, 51, 23, 16, 17.  
165 Liebethal, 167.  
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political consequences of higher education are likely to result from the high-speed 
trajectory of change over a very short period of time. As Tanner recalls, “it is very 
difficult for those of us who have been following China for 20-30 years to recall that it 
was not too long ago that you simply weren’t supposed to write things in China that laid 
out clearly that China suffered from serious problems of drug trafficking or organized 
crime or peasant and labor unrest.” While “there are still a number of taboo topics and 
question that continue to restrain good quality policy research in this system,”166 these 
boundaries are visibly being pushed.  
 The reality is that, in a higher education system that is very young, but growing 
rapidly, standards and norms of research are evolving independently within each sector 
and discipline.167  Compared to government-sponsored think tanks, elite university-
based think tanks seem to have more flexibility. Often privately funded, these institutes 
operate based on different incentives and conduct different styles of research. Generally, 
“they talk to the people, and research, select a topic, then provide suggestions to the top 
leader.”168  
 Reflective of the general trends towards intellectual liberalization taking place 
within these sequestered spheres, in 2009, a non-profit think tank called Beijing 
Gongmen Consulting Co., Ltd., established by Beijing University Law professors LiKun, 
Huang Li, Li Xiang and Wang Hongzhe, published “an investigation report into the 
                                            
166 The Brookings Institute, “Think Tanks in China: Growing Influence and 
Political Limitations” Washington DC, Thursday, Oct. 23, 2008, 17, 42, 19. 
167 In police think tanks, for example, it is not possible for police scholars “to 
ask whether it is even possible for a single party authoritarian system to 
provide the kinds of adequate, autonomous political, legal institutions that 
can ease unrest. Or its not possible to look back at the possibility that the 
lessons from the 1989 Tiananmen demonstration to see if they have any 
relevance for the present. Or to ask, for example, whether there were 
legitimate domestic issues that helped spark the riots in Lhasa on March 14th 
of this year; 23, 19.  
168 Brookings, “Think Tanks in China,” 53. 
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social and economic causes of the 3.14 incident in Tibetan areas.” Called by Saunders, 
the Communications Director at the international Campaign for Tibet (ICT), “a vital 
indication of progressive views on Tibet in China today,”’ the report pushed 
boundaries.169 While the authors do not directly petition the central government, it is 
clear that this is the target audience for their recommendation “to fully recognize the 
citizen status of ordinary people in Tibetan areas” and to formulate development policies 
in accordance with “the rights and interests of ordinary Tibetan people.” 170 It was the 
first time professors at Beijing University Law School assumed there is something they 
don’t understand about the Tibet issue and published a report that dared to challenge 
basic assumptions about the effectiveness and wisdom of current Party policy on Tibet. 
 In 2007, one of the most influential Chinese government think tanks, the 
Development Research Center of the State Council, hired McKinsey & Company to 
consult them. McKinsey & Company told them to, “study from Brookings.” One could 
imagine that if that advice is followed with any success, it will mark a distinct shift in 
Party attitudes towards social actors.  
 Building on the higher education system (since individuals trained in the 
university graduate to work at think tanks,) Chinese think tanks are similarly continuing 
to evolve. As of 2011, even the most prestigious universities and think tanks continue to 
suffer problems in quality and sometimes a tendency to uncritically accept the historic 
Party line on certain issues. Still, the Brookings panel concluded that, “the dynamic 
interaction between the Chinese government on the one side and the country’s 
                                            
169 Novick, Rebecca, “The Tibet Question: A Chinese Think Tank Dares to Ask” 
The Huffington Post, June 20, 2009.  
170 In undertaking the report, the authors sought to find the “social roots” of 
the incidence arising in Tibet and pointedly accuse the state media of 
increasing “mistrust” between Chinese and Tibetans. They concluded that the 
protests were a reaction made under stress by a society and people to the 
various changes that have been taking place in their lives over the past few 
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promising think tanks on the other side can offer insightful information on China’s 
future political trajectory.”  
 Wang believes that “Chinese independent think tanks can be used as a… channel 
to prepare the way to democracy, help the people participate in politics, and express 
their opinion.” Although the power of think tanks has gradually become more 
institutionalized over the past ten years or so, their power continues to depend mostly on 
personal relationships between individual researchers or directors and key political 
leaders. Regardless of weakly institutionalized power, however, these changes matter 
because, for the first time, the research has been done. The boundaries of acceptable 
have been pushed.  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN: 
The Evolving Chinese Political Dialogue  
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.1: Universal Values  
 
 As research entities deeply connected to the university (whose members were 
trained within university walls,) think tanks have helped to translate knowledge from the 
university into public policy. For example, “in the past 25 years, the Chinese People’s 
Public Security University and Number Four Public Security Research Institute have 
helped to spotlight and analyze emerging, or in many cases historically reemerging, 
social order threats that were once considered completely taboo.”171   These have all been 
examples of the percolation model taking successful practices from small, localized 
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government experiments and expanding them to other localities through a slow process 
of ideational transmission.  
 The combination of China’s repressive political system, (with its lack of 
opposition parties, trade unions, or public disagreement between politicians), and state 
media (designed to buttress social control rather than ensure political accountability,) 
amplifies the power of Chinese intellectuals to set the agenda of political debate. While 
one could easily debate whether it is intellectuals who influence decision-makers, or if 
rather groups of decision-makers who use chosen intellectuals to strengthen the 
credibility of their views, the fact remains that intellectuals from elite social science and 
law departments are regularly asked to i) brief the politburo in “study sessions,” and ii) 
prepare reports on which the Party’s five-year plans tend to be based.  
 In this capacity, they can and often do define policy reforms taken by the regime. 
This chapter relays some anecdotal examples of this occurring in both the economic and 
political arenas of CCP governance, and pinpoints some of the central features of the 
ongoing debates in these elite, politically oriented university departments that are just 
beginning to shape political reforms.172  
  Very recently in the past few years, for example, the term “universal values,” or 
pushi jiazhi (普世价值) has entered the Chinese political debate. While, in contrast to the 
Western conception of political rights which, as articulated in the American Declaration 
of Independence are considered to be “G-d given” to each individual, the Chinese have 
traditionally viewed rights as handed down from the ruler, or government, to the people, 
modern Chinese no longer seem convinced.  As Qin Xiao, the chairman of a state-owned 
bank, told 2000 people at Tsinghua University earlier this year, “universal values tell us 
that government serves the people, that assets belong to the people and that 
urbanization is for the sake of people’s happiness.” In contrast, he continued, 
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“supporters of the ‘China model’…believe the opposite: that people should obey the 
government, the state should control assets and the interests of individuals are 
subordinate to those of local development”173  
 While the CCP argues that ‘universal values’ are simply Western values and their 
proponents are seeking to westernize China, many influential Chinese intellectuals are 
taking a middle ground and actively seeking new mechanisms of governance to ensure 
government responsiveness and accountability in other ways.174 
 As the possibilities for critical evaluations of governance expand within the 
university, so has the dynamism of ideological debate.175 The Economist reports that the 
“philosophical question of whether universal values exist” has “been smoldering in China 
for the past two years,” and “has turned into a political fight, dividing scholars, the 
media, and even, some analysts believe, China’s leaders.”176 Liberal intellectuals 
sympathetic to the cause of democracy and “universal values” clash with conservative 
fears that embracing universal values would risk political chaos and acknowledging the 
superiority of western political systems.177 If the proposed relationship between 
university scholarship and political outcomes is true, the future direction of Chinese 
reforms may be deeply affected by how this debate unfolds. If current trends in 
                                            
173 “The debate over universal values” The Economist, October 2nd 2010. 
174 Some of these new techniques include those developed by Pan Wei and 
Fang Ning based off of James Fishkin’s idea of “deliberative polling.” See 
Leonard, Mark, “China’s New Intelligentsia” Prospect, March 28, 2008; To 
understand the Chinese government position on “universal values,” see their 
reaction to recent award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo. This is seen 
as an attempt by the west to interfere in China’s domestic affairs and seek to 
westernize it.  
175 See Leonard, 2008; Fogel, 2010  
176 “The debate over universal values” The Economist, October 2nd 2010  
177 The Charter 08 manifesto, written in part by recent Nobel Peace Prize 
winner Liu Xiaobo, demanded that the CCP dismantle its authoritarian 
system and recognize universal values by “joining the mainstream of 
civilization and setting up a democracy.” 
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scholarship are any indication, it is likely that an alternative system of accountability will 
develop as a middle ground between these two political philosophies on the relationship 
of the individual to the state. 178 
 
 
7.2: The “New Right” and The “New Left”  
 
 Since the inauguration of the “11th Five Year Plan” under Hu Jintao and Wen 
Jiabao at the end of 2005, the intellectual balance of power in Beijing has subtly drifted 
to the left. Like in all political communities, there are ideological divides among Chinese 
policy-makers.  On the one hand, the “new right,” which gained true prominence during 
the 1980s into the 1990s, and which envisions a more laissez-faire political economic 
approach, favors continuing to stimulate economic growth and trust in the market’s 
trickle down effect to spread wealth across society. On the other, the “new left,” a more 
recent product of China’s new-found relative affluence, suggests the need for social 
policies to distribute wealth more equally.  Among this second group is Wang Hui, who 
teaches at the prestigious Tsinghua University in Beijing and developed many of his 
political ideas while in the United States in the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen 
crackdown. Wang worries a great deal about China’s social inequality and spends much 
of his time advocating for better social redistribution by writing reports on local 
corruption and helping workers organize.  It is his view that “China is caught between 
the two extremes of misguided socialism and crony capitalism, and suffering from the 
worst elements of both.” Thus, while orienting the country towards market reforms, 
“China’s development must be more balanced.” While it is unclear which side will win 
these ideological intellectual debates, the “new left” seems to be gaining ground.  
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 Within the new left agenda, for example, is a plan to develop a Chinese variant of 
‘social democracy.’179  Its influence is reflected to a certain degree in the 11th Plan’s vision 
of “harmonious society” –which, for the first time since the start of the reform era talked 
about introducing a welfare state with promises of a 20 percent per year-on-year 
increase in the funds available for pensions, unemployment benefits, health insurance 
and maternity leave. For rural Chinese, the plan promised an end to arbitrary taxes and 
improved health and education. The plan also pledged to address environmental 
concerns by reducing energy consumption 20 percent.  
 Another interesting feature of Chinese intellectual political debates are the 
various reformulations of the notion of “democracy” pushed for by reformers since the 
1980s and 1990s to present.180 Just as Zhang Weiying’s 1984 idea for “dual-track pricing” 
became the fundamental policy behind CCP economic reforms, Yu Keping has developed 
models for the gradual implementation of political reforms.  
 Yu, who runs an institute that is “part university, part think tank, part 
management consultancy for government reform,” is a close informal adviser to 
President Hu Jintao. It is his belief that implementing overnight political reform in 
China would be akin to economic “shock therapy” for its disruptiveness, and yet he is a 
staunch believer in democracy. In a similar vein as the gradualism reflected in Zhang’s 
“dual-track pricing,” Yu has promoted the idea of democracy gradually taking root in 
Chinese society based on two parallel, simultaneous processes: i) democracy at the 
grassroots level gradually working its way up through percolation of successful 
experiments, and ii) democratic structures that would, develop first within the party’s 
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internal structure and then spread gradually to the rest of society as norms become 
better institutionalized.181  
 Whatever one believes about the likelihood of such a model being successful, the 
influence of Yu’s ideas among high-level policy-making is undeniable. Cheng Li has 
written about the extent to which the  Chinese Party and state-run media have begun to 
use the term “intra-Party democracy,” or dangnei minzhu (党内民主) in recent years, as 
a form of institutionalized checks and balances within the CCP. In September 2009, the 
Fourth Plenary Session of the 17th Central Committee of the CCP called for institutional 
changes such as promoting democracy within the Party and intensifying the 
anticorruption drive within the leadership. “According to the directives adopted at the 
meeting, many problems internal to the Party are ‘exacerbated by new domestic 
circumstances and ‘are severely weakening the Party’s creativity, unity and effectiveness 
in dealing with these problems.’ Therefore, careful management of the Party ‘has never 
been so arduous and urgent.’ The directives particularly stress the importance of intra-
Party democracy, describing it as the ‘lifeblood of the Party’ (dang de shengming, 党的生
命).”   
 In the West, meanwhile, the concept of “intra-Party democracy” is usually 
brushed off as “little more than expedient Chinese political rhetoric.” Multi-party 
competition is, in the minds of most Western observers, a bedrock feature of democracy 
and the Chinese leadership shows little inclination to move in that direction. Yet, 
especially in the context of China’s recent institutional history and weak ideational flows 
through which to even learn the intricacies of such institutional designs, it seems one 
ought to agree with him that “democracy is a continuous historical process and a matter 
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of degree,” and so “democratic political institutions may vary greatly from place to place 
and across time.”182 Leonard reflected that these nascent institutional hybrids may have 
some future, since “it is possible to imagine informal new left and new right groupings 
one day even becoming formal parties within the party. If the Communist Party were a 
country, its 70 million members would make it bigger than Britain.”183 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
 
 
 In thirty-some years, the Chinese higher education system has been 
transformed, from literally non-existence in 1977, to the largest higher education system 
in the world in 2011. What is more, the bulk of this change has taken place only in the 
last ten years.  China is now home to 98.3 million college graduates, and the government 
is determined to grow that number to 195 million by 2020.  China’s 2010 Talent Plan is 
evidence that the Party believes its future is tied to the academic quality of its higher 
educational institutions.  The CCP is emphasizing higher education as a qualification for 
leadership at the same time as Chinese universities are becoming increasingly integrated 
with the international market, and are growing in sophistication, having tried to conform 
to international standards of academic inquiry.   Not only are Chinese universities 
becoming increasingly international, but Chinese students are studying abroad in 
unprecedented numbers. 
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When the CCP developed its strategy for massive expansion in the higher 
education system, few people could have foreseen the changes that would take place.  
CCP leaders implemented the changes to higher education policies they thought were 
necessary to maintaining political legitimacy after the disasters of the late Mao years.  By 
the 1990s, reform had had so many unintended consequences across the political 
economy that the need to cope with these growing complexities increasingly drove policy 
forward. CCP leaders have come to rely increasingly on experts from universities and 
think tanks in China to develop and shape their policies.  CCP leaders themselves are 
more highly educated than ever before.  The Party understands the importance of having 
accurate information and expert opinion in formulating successful public policy and is 
now relying more and more upon input from the educational elite. 
The Chinese political system remains a work-in-progress, and the structure of its 
institutions of governance are still being worked out.  While co-opting the universities 
and think tanks has proven beneficial to the CCP in legitimizing its power, in governing 
the country and achieving unprecedented economic growth, the increasing influence of 
the intellectual elite is bound to have unintended consequences.  Education once 
attained cannot be taken away from an individual.   Members of the elite universities and 
think tanks have been given increasing academic freedom and engage routinely in 
creative, critical thinking.  It is likely that this may have liberalization implications for 
China’s political regime.   Also the growing educated middle class is likely to push for 
great political freedom. The increasing internationalization of Chinese universities and 
increased study abroad by Chinese students has created ideational flow of Western 
political ideas that are interacting with Chinese cultural norms. This is likely to create 
new political institutions that may be a hybrid of Western and Eastern traditions.    As 
the current younger generation of future leaders continues to emerge on the political 
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scene and China’s nascent higher education system continues to mature, they will likely 
create a new force for the Party to reckon with.       
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Appendix 5: Ranks of Universities in China Among Universities in the 
World 
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(Shanghai Jiaotong 
University) 
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(top 200) 
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Appendix 6: Case Study of Successful Reforms in Zeguo 
Township, Wenling City, Zhejiang Province 
 
This political experiment was designed by American Political Scientist 
James Fishkin, and implemented in collaboration with Chinese political 
scientists He Baogang.184  
  
Wenling city, in which Zeguo township is located, had begun toying with 
“democratic discussions” in 1999 as an attempt to bolster the Party’s 
authority. Leaders who were trying to get a political education campaign 
under way were having trouble getting people to show up, so they 
switched tactics and began offering “dialogues” in which residents could 
exchanges ideas with their leaders, instead of simply being lectured to. 
Mu Yifei, deputy director of Wenling’s Publicity Bureau explained to 
Times Asia Magazine that “we propaganda officials aren’t in the 
democracy business…but slowly this idea caught on. The people and the 
leaders started to value each others input.” When Jiang Zhaohua, the 
Communist Party secretary for Zeguo township in Wenling city, met 
Fishkin at a conference in Hangzhou in November 2004, he was looking 
for a way to decide on which public works projects to spend funds while 
avoiding “the headache of having to guess at what people want,” or any 
perception that he may have chosen certain projects because of 
kickbacks.185 Intrigued by Fishkin’s technique of “deliberative polling” to 
better incorporate public opinion into the policy making process after 
detailed consultations of the pros and cons of particular decisions, Jiang 
agreed to allow Fishkin to test his model’s applicability in China in hopes 
of getting a “scientific reading” of Zeguo’s preferences. 186  When Jiang 
announced the experiment to Zeguo township of 110,000 people who 
would begin to experiment with deliberative polling to allow citizens’ 
                                            
184 Fishkin, who teaches at Stanford University received his B.A. from Yale in 
1970 and holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Yale as well as a second Ph.D. 
in Philosophy from Cambridge.184In 1988, when he developed “Deliberative 
Polling,” a social science experiment designed to better incorporate public 
opinion and consultation into the policy making process, it is unlikely anyone 
in the CCP leadership noticed or cared. And yet in 2005, Fishkin became party 
to an unintended consequence of higher education reforms. 
185 Born in 1963, Jiang is fairly young for a local leader and has a degree in 
philosophy. 
186 Jakes, Susan, “Dabbling in Democracy: No one knew what to expect when 
a Chinese town tried listening to its people” Time Asia Magazine, Saturday 
April 16, 2005.  
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preferences to determine, how public funds would be spent, Jiang peppered his speech 
with references to Rousseau, Voltaire and Montesquieu.187 Yet his reasons for 
implementing deliberative polling in Zeguo were not ideological so much as practical.  
 When Jiang invited Fishkin to attempt deliberative democracy polling in 2005, 
he was building on this momentum of successful governance strategy. The difference 
made by such practices is stark: On April 10, 2005, one day after Jiang invited 257 
randomly selected residents of Zeguo township to convene at a schoolhouse and decide 
which of thirty possible government-proposed infrastructure projects to fund, thousands 
of citizens in the neighboring township of Huaxi rioted over chemical plants they claimed 
were polluting the town. 
 Huaxi is only 100 km away from Zeguo, and yet a local schoolteacher told Time 
Asia Magazine “that kind of thing doesn’t happen in Zeguo…here the people and the 
leaders don’t feel so far away from each other.” Commenting on the nature of state-
society relations under different models of decision-making, Jiang explained candidly 
that “out original manner was the government deciding everything, only announcing the 
results afterward to the people…we never got to know the public’s opinion. It was 20 
people sitting in a room who decided everything.” Now he wants to train local cadres in 
data analysis so that he can hold more polls and benefit form the informational utility of 
public deliberation.  
 There are practical benefits for such decision-making methods. Unrest has been 
rising in China as lack of transparency, widespread corruption and abuses of power have 
enraged newly empowered Chinese residents. Even in the countryside, rural Chinese 
have begun networking through cell phones and Internet to assert themselves through 
public protest. Where leadership is less adaptive, such as in Dongyang, a city a few hours’ 
drive from Zeguo, an estimated 30,000 villagers fought off more than 1,000 riot 
policemen in 2005, after local officials simply handed 163 acres of land to 13 private and 
state-owned chemical plants. In the process, they smashed government cars and 40 
government cars, and sent as many as 30 policemen to the hospital. Many people were 
injured, and the plants idled. A few months later in Dingzhou city of Hebei province, a 
similar dispute over land use sparked an attack on village residents as up to 300 thugs 
attempted to forcefully remove villagers who refused to make way for a new power plant. 
Twenty-two people were arrested, six farmers were killed, and fifty-one people were 
wounded in the process. The democratic type input obtained from the citizens of Zeguo 
is a far more effective alternative .188 
 Howard French, who reported on the Zeguo experiments for the New York 
Times, observed that, “if unique in form, Zeguo’s experiment takes place against a 
backdrop of a broad effervescence of democratic ideas bubbling up into local politics all 
over China. By one estimate, there will be 300,000 village committee elections in China’s 
18 provinces this year alone. In many areas, officials are making efforts to involve 
ordinary local people in decision making.” While the state of inequality in China makes it 
an unlikely cite for democracy, it seems some incentives for political adjustment towards 
greater degrees of public representation may be emerging. 
 As Li Fan, director of the World and China Institute, a nongovernmental institute 
in Beijing that studies electoral reform observed, “the experiments taking place here and 
there are very meaningful, because China’s economic reforms began the same way. The 
                                            
187 French, Howard W. “China’s New Frontiers: Tests of Democracy and 
Dissent” The New York Times, June 19, 2005.  
188 At this point, it should be said that other democratic experiments, such as 
that in Sichuan province have been less successful, and, in fact, in 2008, 
Sichuan was the place with the highest number of mass protests in China. 
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central government didn’t know how to carry them out, so it relied on local 
governments.” Of course, the process is nowhere near complete –and there is no 
guarantee it will ever reach its true potential. Mr. Li was careful to point out that the 
most important breakthroughs would not come until the assemblies, known as people’s 
congresses, that already exist at local, provincial and national levels, were given real say, 
instead of meeting one day a year, as is typical, to endorse the government’s decisions. 
While “the Communist Party doesn’t want this, because they are afraid the congresses 
will criticize the government,” most of the changes in governance at the local level over 
the past ten years would have been similarly unpredictable. The Chinese state is in the 
process of great flux that brings political change whether the CCP would like it to or not–
the existence of so many unpredictable variables, however, makes the directionality of 
these changes unknowable.189  
 
 
                                            
189 See Fishkin, James, Baogang He, Robert C. Luskin and Alice Siu, 
“Deliberative Democracy in an Unlikely Place: Deliberative Polling in China” 
Cambridge University Press, 2010.  
